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Abstract
The presented research investigates two areas in security of Demand Side Management
(DSM) systems in Smart Grid including privacy aware energy storage management and
risk assessment of cyber attack on DSM communication infrastructure.
The first topic studies the privacy-cost saving tradeoff of an in-home energy storage sys-
tem in demand response for an individual user. DSM systems in the electricity grid, which
rely on two way communication between the consumers and utility, require the transmis-
sion of instantaneous energy consumption to utilities. Perfect knowledge of a user’s power
consumption profile by a utility is a violation of privacy and can be detrimental to the
successful implementation of demand response systems. It has been shown that an in-home
energy storage system (such as a battery/inverter) that provides a viable means to achieve
the cost savings of instantaneous electricity pricing without inconvenience can also be used
to hide a user’s power usage pattern. A fundamental tradeoff exists between the costs saved
and the degree of privacy achievable, and in this work, the tradeoff achievable by a finite
capacity battery assuming a zero tolerance for activity delay is studied using a Markov
process model for user’s demands and instantaneous electricity prices. Due to high compu-
tational complexity (continuous state-action space) of the stochastic control model, inner
and upper bounds are presented on the optimal tradeoff. In particular, a class of battery
charging policies based on minimizing “revealing states” is proposed to derive achievable
privacy-cost savings tradeoffs. The performance of this algorithm is compared with inner
bounds derived using a greedy heuristic and upper bounds derived using an information
theoretic rate distortion approach. The framework proposed is shown to be applicable even
when users only desire partial information protection such as presence/absence of activity
or specific appliances they wish to hide.
The second topic studies the competitive energy storage sharing in demand response.
Deregulated electricity markets with time varying electricity prices and opportunities for
consumer cost mitigation makes energy storage such as a battery an attractive proposition.
Sharing a large capacity battery across a group of homes in a community, can not only
alleviate the economic deterrents but also exploit the fact that users’ activity patterns do
not necessarily overlap. However, battery sharing induces competition for battery capacity
between the users in general as they may want to maximize their own cost savings by occu-
pying more battery capacity when the electricity price is low. Importantly, users might have
privacy concerns when they communicate with the shared battery controller. The privacy
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aware management of such a shared battery is the focus of this work. A game theoretical
framework was proposed to capture the competitive behaviors of users sending messages
through a communication network to an independent battery controller with an infinite
horizon limiting average signaling game formulation. The privacy requirement serves as
a constraint on messaging behaviors. The battery controller manages the charging and
discharging based on the received, albeit incomplete, information transmission. With such
a framework, we study the battery sharing when users are cooperative and completely pri-
vate. When the privacy requirement is relaxed, the competitive behaviors of users sending
messages to the battery controller is studied. A credit based battery management strategy
is designed for the battery controller to ensure an equilibrium of the game and achieves the
social optimality. However, the credit based battery management requires long time estab-
lished observations and may also “coerce” users to share their energy demands accurately
with the controller. We therefore, propose, a class of stationary suboptimal privacy preserv-
ing battery management strategy in which the message set being restricted to be completely
private or partially private. In addition, we demonstrate that by changing the size of the
message set, different pairs of preserved privacy and cost savings can be achieved. Through
numerical simulations on real electricity pricing and usage data, we demonstrate the cost
effectiveness of battery capacity sharing and the tradeoff between privacy preserving and
cost mitigation using privacy preserving battery management strategy.
The third topic study the risk assessment of cyber attack on DSM system including
economically motivated meter tampering and malicious cyber attack. Cyber-enabled De-
mand Side Management (DSM) plays a crucial role in smart grid by providing automated
decision-making capabilities that selectively schedule loads on these local grids to improve
power balance and grid stability. Security and reliability of the cyber infrastructure that en-
ables DSM is therefore critical to ensuring reliability and safety in energy delivery systems.
The DSM communication are usually built on Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI).
However, by virtue of topological weaknesses, it is vulnerable to cyber attacks that are un-
detectable or stealthy. In this work, we investigate the topological vulnerabilities of DSM
networks that could result in potential theft of electricity through hacked smart meters. In
particular, a provably correct risk assessment protocol is proposed to identify completely
the individual nodes in mesh network based AMIs that are potential targets of such eco-
nomically motivated stealthy cyber attacks. The protocol proposed utilizes knowledge of
the network topology and data obtained from existing system monitoring technologies. A
case study is provided to demonstrate the protocol and its effectiveness. Another major
challenge in DSM security is that the feedback mechanism in the load management may
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aggravate the impact of cyber attack on the DSM system. We investigate the behavior
of such feedback loop under the intentional cyber attack and evaluate its potential risk of
overloading the power grid components. In particular, a tight upper bound is provided to
characterize the potential risk when a fixed portion of the controllable loads are compro-
mised.
3
1. Introduction
Renewable energy share had increased to more than a quarter of global electricity pro-
duction at the end of 2015 and this number has been rising every year [1]. Due to increased
volatility of renewable energy and the emergence of flexible load scheduling through energy
management systems, grid operators have already begun to rely on demand side man-
agement (DSM) technology to match anticipated demand with the temporal generation
profile [2].
1.1 Utility-Privacy Tradeoff of Energy Storage Management
Demand response, as is well known, requires two way communication between the
consumer and the utility; the utility transmits instantaneous prices, and the consumer’s
instantaneous (or granulated) consumption is transmitted back to the utility. The time
varying prices provide incentive for the consumer to change his/her usage patterns providing
operational benefit to the utility and cost benefit to the consumer. When this two way
communication is perfect, in the absence of any consumer side action, or in other words, if
the consumer’s consumption pattern does not adapt to the demand response mechanism, i)
there is no cost-saving due to instantaneous prices ii) user’s privacy can be violated due to
non-intrusive load monitoring by the utility [3,4]. The primary theme is to study a demand
response scenario that aims to alleviate both these concerns, or in other words, save costs
and maintain privacy.
Cost-savings alone can be accomplished by the consumer should he choose to alter his
consumption pattern, for instance, by turning on appliances when prices are low and reduc-
ing activities when prices are high. Such strategies save costs by reducing user convenience
(due to delay in activities) and do not alleviate the privacy issue.
An alternative mechanism to save costs without incurring much delay is the use of an in-
home battery. Many recent studies [5–7] have investigated optimal charging and discharging
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policies for batteries that balance cost savings with user convenience. In addition, practical
experiments by ABB and GM in the United States [8] have demonstrated the viability and
cost effectiveness for small scale storage to supply up to 3 hours of electricity usage for
a group of 2-3 homes. An in-home battery can be charged when prices are low and be
an alternative source of electricity when prices are high thus achieving cost-savings even
under the assumption that “all demand is met immediately” either from the grid or from the
battery. Most notably, in addition to providing cost-savings while guaranteeing convenience,
the use of a battery can also provide privacy of actual demand– at any given time, the total
consumption as measured by the utility would be an aggregate of the demand and the
battery charge or discharge and without knowing exactly the amount of inflow or outflow
of electricity from the battery, there is uncertainty in the real demand. From the consumer
perspective, there are two objectives, cost-savings and privacy protection, accomplished to
varying degrees through the use of an in-home battery. These objectives are not necessarily
aligned and the primary purpose is to investigate the tradeoff between these objectives such
that users can tailor their battery charging/discharging mechanism to satisfy their desires
for cost-savings and privacy.
In this work, we study the design of battery charging and discharging algorithms
under practical limitations in response to time varying demand and prices assuming a zero
tolerance for delay. For this purpose, we investigate a formal mathematical framework using
Markov modeled systems and use Shannon’s equivocation [9] to characterize the uncertainty
of the demand from the utility’s perspective.
The notion of privacy we consider is acausal in the sense that the eavesdropper/utility
can observe the entire time horizon of consumption data (the prices and fine grained electric-
ity purchase data) to estimate the usage pattern in a household. Under this framework, we
demonstrate that the optimal policy is in fact a solution to a Partially Observable Markov
Decision Process with non linear belief dependent rewards (ρ-POMDP). Due to the continu-
ous state-action space in this model, deriving optimal policies is computationally infeasible.
We therefore propose a class of battery charging policies based on minimizing the frequency
of ”revealing states” so as to obtain an achievable privacy-cost savings tradeoff for users.
When the underlying model is limited to i.i.d. demand and price processes, we show that
the parameters of this class can be optimized analytically. We compare the resulting per-
formance with a greedy heuristic that aims to maximize instantaneous privacy and cost
savings rewards, as well as with an upper bound on the privacy-cost savings tradeoff which
we derive using classical information theoretic rate-distortion optimization. The closeness
of the derived bounds, as shown in Section 3.5 based on real electricity usage and pricing
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data, demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed class of algorithms. In some scenarios, a user
may only be interested in hiding some basic information such as his presence/absence, or
a particular usage pattern; we extend our formulation to measure such partial information
leakage and analyze the protection our proposed policies can provide.
1.2 Privacy Aware Management of Distributed End-user En-
ergy Storage Sharing
Renewable energy share had increased to more than a quarter of global electricity pro-
duction at the end of 2015 and this number has been rising every year [1]. The increased
penetration of unpredictable renewable energy sources and the emergence of flexible load
scheduling through energy management systems, have led grid operators to start relying on
demand response technology to match anticipated demand with the temporal generation
profile [2]. A popular tool in demand response is time-varying prices, which induces con-
sumers to modulate their electricity usage to facilitate better planning and maximize grid
efficiency; for instance price variation can be used to shave off the peak power consumption
and consequently reduce the need for inefficient peak power generators. The success of
demand response relies on time varying prices providing the opportunity for consumers to
save costs should they choose to alter their consumption pattern, for instance, by turn-
ing on appliances when prices are low and reducing activities when prices are high. Such
strategies save costs by reducing user convenience (due to delay in activities).
The time varying pricing also provides an opportunity for consumers to save cost
without sacrificing convenience through the use of an energy storage system such as a
battery and inverter; consumers can charge the battery when prices are low and discharge
the battery for activities when prices are high thus limiting the need to delay their activities
while still saving costs. However, we notice that the installation of in-home energy storage
does incur fixed purchase costs and recurring maintenance costs and could be expensive for
an individual consumer [10]; sharing a large battery by a group of homes in a community
or apartments in a building can eliminate the economic deterrents through cost-sharing.
In addition, a large scale battery can also provide increased supply to users whose activity
patterns do not overlap significantly– each user can share his unused battery capacity with
other users or access other users’ unused capacity. Practical experiments by ABB and GM
in the United States [8] have demonstrated the viability and cost effectiveness for small
scale storage to supply up to 3 hours of electricity usage for a group of 2-3 homes. Such
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shared storage is inherent to the vision of sustainable microgrids– groups of interconnected
loads and distributed energy resources within clearly defined boundaries that act as a single
controllable entity with respect to the grid.
However, since the battery is shared among users instead of belonging to a single
party, it should be managed by an independent controller on behalf of the commonwealth
of all users. Meanwhile, a direct electricity consumption monitoring is not possible and the
controller usually relies on a communication network to receive users’ reports on their status.
Based on the received information, the battery controller decide how much electricity to be
stored for each user. Two questions rise naturally in this scenario:
• Competition among users for the limited battery capacity. This is because more
capacity can leads additional cost savings. As as a result, users may not be honest
about their real demands with the controller. A simple strategy would be exaggerating
upcoming electricity demands when price is expected to increase.
• The privacy concerns for reporting accurate detailed energy consumption. As demon-
strated in [4], user’s in-home activities can be revealed using appliance signatures if
detailed energy consumption is known by an adversary.
Therefore, it is essential to understand the competitive behaviors across users with
privacy requirement when sharing the battery and be prepared for the possible uncertainty
in users’ messaging over the communication network.
It is towards the privacy aware management of such a shared battery that this article
provides theoretical contributions beside a more comprehensive and complete formulation
of the battery sharing problem.
In particular, we propose a game theoretical framework to characterize the messaging
behaviors of users with privacy requirements when they share a energy storage and aim to
maximize their own cost reductions individually. The corresponding battery management
strategies are studied, which are adaptive to time varying demands and prices assuming a
zero tolerance for activity delay. With such a framework, we analyze the battery sharing
when users are cooperative, privacy aware and completely private. When privacy is not a
concern, we show that there always exists a non-stationary social optimal battery control
policy – a credit based battery management scheme that ensures game theoretical equilib-
rium among all players. With this strategy, no user can have any economic incentives by
forfeiting electricity demand information to the battery controller. Meanwhile, the battery
controller optimizes the social welfare for all users thanks to the complete and accurate
information on the whole system.
6
In this battery sharing system, different users may have different priorities to the
shared battery since the purchase and maintenance costs of the battery could be divided
unequally across them. Consequently, there exists an achievable cost savings region in which
each point corresponds to a simultaneously achievable set of cost-savings for the group of
users. Depending on the users’ priority, the energy storage sharing system can operate at
any point in the region. To characterize such cost savings region, the controller assigns
different weights to the users and aims to optimize the social welfare which is a weighted
objective.
We note that any shared resource management system requires certain operational
policies or axioms that all users and the controller adhere to. However, the objective of
every user is to minimize its own electricity cost by choosing an appropriate message to
send. In order to capture the potential dishonest messaging behaviors, we do not specify the
communication protocols that all users adhere to, but rather make them implicit through
the definition of the battery controller and the users’ actions and objective. In contrast,
based on battery status, electricity price, received messages and other public information
including the environment condition, the battery controller decides the amount of electricity
to be charged or discharged in battery for each user simultaneously. These quantities are
chosen to optimize a weighted sum of the cost-savings across users. By sweeping across all
possible weightings, we can characterize an achievable cost savings region.
There are two flavors to time varying pricing in demand response. Time-of-use pricing
provides ’on-peak’ and ’off-peak’ price levels where the price level depends on the time of
day and season of the year. These price schedules are determined in advance and don’t
change frequently. Real-time pricing is more adaptive to market forces wherein the retail
electricity price changes hourly or half-hourly and are based on instantaneous prices at the
wholesale energy market. To encourage the efficient use of electricity, an increasing number
of utilities start to use real time pricing in the retail market to coordinate the customers
demand responses to the benefit of individual customers and the overall system. The focus
of this work is on investigating the users’ competition over battery capacity, the battery
control policies and achievable cost savings when certain privacy protection is required
under real-time pricing. Mathematically, we formulate the problem as an infinite horizon
limiting average stochastic signaling game with privacy constraints and multiple players in
a scenario that “net-metering” – where users can sell stored electricity back to the grid
for profit– is allowed. But our major results can also be generalized to the scenario where
net-metering is not allowed as the they share similar principals.
Through the mathematical analysis, we will show that when privacy is not a concern,
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a non-stationary policy, the credit based battery management scheme, always optimizes
a weighted sum of user costs – social optimal – and achieves a game theoretical equilib-
rium. In this policy, users will provide detailed and honest demand information to the
battery controller since one user’s access to the battery is strictly denied whenever he is
found giving an “dishonest” message. Therefore, the battery management is simplified to
a centralized control problem which was formulated as an infinite horizon limiting average
Markov Decision process. Through the mathematical optimization, we will show that, the
optimal centralized battery control yields a policy structure wherein the optimal action of
the controller is always independent of current state of the battery, i.e., amounts of energy
stored for each user in the battery. We then show that the dynamic policy optimization
can be reduced to an integer linear programming solution with largely reduced complexity.
However, the social-optimal battery management, the credit based battery manage-
ment, require long time established observations and also “coerces” users to share their
energy demands accurately with the controller which leads to privacy concerns. We there-
fore propose a suboptimal privacy preserving battery management strategy in which the
message set is restricted to be completely private or partially private. In the special case
that the electricity price and users’ demands are independent conditioned on the core state,
we demonstrate that the completely private battery management strategy relying on only
public available information is optimal for the battery management. We also demonstrate
the cost effectiveness of battery capacity sharing and the tradeoff between privacy preserv-
ing and cost mitigation using privacy preserving battery management strategy with real
electricity usage and pricing data.
1.3 Quantitative Risk Assessment of Cyber Attack on DSM
Cyber-enabled DSM relies heavily on real-time, two-way communication capabilities
between a central controller and various system elements, including flexible loads. Security
and reliability of the cyber infrastructure that enables DSM is therefore critical to ensuring
the reliability and safety in such systems.
In the electricity retail market with variable-electricity pricing, the real-time, two-
way communication capabilities of Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMI) enables a
utility/load aggregator to collect fine grained usage from consumers and provide electricity
pricing schedules to them. In addition, as an existing network infrastructure, it is also
being considered as a preferred network access point for other DSM applications including
direct load control and distributed energy resource management [11]. The critical role
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placed on these embedded devices, AMIs, arises significant security concerns since they are
physically attached to users’ properties and directly accessible by the users. Large-scale
deployments of AMIs encourage the use of marginally cheaper hardware which results in
limited computational resources to support advanced security functions such as intrusion
monitoring. This also stymies the ability to produce sufficient randomness to create secure
cryptographic keys [12]. We also note that the use of public-key-infrastructure (PKI) in AMI
network is still rare which naturally raises the problem of key management and potential
cyber attacks, such as man-in-the-middle data injection attack.
In Black Hat Europe 2014, researchers Javier Vazquez Vidal and Alberto Garcia Illera
demonstrated how they were able to reverse engineer smart meters widely used in Spain,
finding blatant vulnerabilities in the hardware [13]. While most smart meters currently
installed in Spain used strong symmetric encryption standard AES-128, all AMI units
shared the same encryption key which is stored in plain text in the flash memory. In other
words, malicious party with access to one AMI device can launch a man-in-the-middle
attack and spoof all communication traffic from/to any other smart meters easily. At
the same time, the trend of open source tools makes access to AMI hacking tools and
tutorials easier than ever. One example is the open source smart meter security test tool,
Termineter, released by SecureState on Github [14] which allows users to interact with a
smart meter with one of its I\O interface. Though the intention of these tools is to enable
authorized users to test the security of AMI and to promote the awareness of AMI security,
it nevertheless allows malicious parties from taking advantage of this tool.
Though there is no specific standard on AMI communication networks, mesh network
structure has been widely adopted or proposed in industry [15,16]. A mesh network will use
each node to relay data and will reconfigure itself if one path is broken. Though it is robust
to node failures and easy to scale, the security level of a mesh network can suffer when
the network is not well connected [17, 18]. The vulnerabilities of an AMI communication
network can be exploited by disabling attacks on the underlying communication infrastruc-
ture, insertion of false user requests, unauthorized alteration of DSM schedules and illegal
market manipulation; all of which can impact system operations and result in both power
shortage and economic losses. If one meter is hacked, not only can its own communication
with the utility be altered, but all other communication transmitted through it may also
be exposed to manipulation if man-in-the-middle attacks are launched [19].
While the majority of these vulnerabilities can be modelled using false data injection
attacks, there are various strategies in system monitoring to detect and identify bad mea-
surements, including nonrandom false data injection attacks [20]. However, it has been
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demonstrated that undetectable attacks are still possible if attackers are aware of the sys-
tem monitoring configuration [21]. We demonstrate that this weakness of traditional system
monitoring technology can be exploited for electricity theft through hacked smart meters
in AMI relying on mesh networks to communicate between consumers and the utility.
To analyze the topological vulnerabilities of an AMI network against economically
motivated stealthy cyber attack, traditional topology analysis or system monitoring tech-
nology alone are not sufficient. In this work, a novel risk assessment protocol is proposed
to analyze potential targets within existing AMI communication networks that are vulner-
able to stealthy, uncoordinated, and economically-motivated cyber attacks. In doing so, we
incorporate existing system monitoring technologies. While this protocol can help to assess
the potential vulnerabilities of AMI communication network, it also assists to plan a more
secure and robust communication network infrastructure. The AMI network designer can
utilize the provided warnings and reduce the risk by placing additional AMI data collectors
or system monitoring devices. In addition, the study of risk assessment is also a starting
point of automated and optimal secure AMI network planning. Case study is provided to
demonstrate the process of this method and its effectiveness.
After the quantitative evaluation of the economically motivated AMI hacking, we want
to evaluate the potential risk of malicious cyber attacks on the DSM system.
The challenges of the DSM security lie in the feedback mechanism of the load manage-
ment and the geographically distributed controllable loads and communication resources.
Though each load contributes only a small amount of power and its compromising might
not cause a noticeable impact on the energy delivery system, a carefully planned cyber
attack can spread and impact a wide range of controllable loads. Meanwhile, the attacker
can utilize the feedback mechanism of the load management to aggravate its impact and
eventually cause overloads on certain critical devices or major power line and jeopardize
the energy delivery system.
The key motivation is the fact that constructing an attack-proof DSM communication
network is almost impossible and cost ineffective. For instance, the classic method to pre-
vent the man-in-the-middle cyber attack is to treat the communication link as unreliable
and to use the public key encryption to conduct key exchange when starting a new commu-
nication session between any DSM device and the data collectors. However, key generation
is difficult due to the limited randomness that can be produced from an embedded de-
vice [12]. In addition, certificate management in PKI which is already an open problem
is even harder to guarantee in this context [22]. Even if there is an currently unbreakable
security mechanism, it can fail eventually due to the improved hardware and algorithm or
10
later discovered vulnerabilities. Consequently, the man-in-the-middle attack is very much
a realistic possibility in this context. Therefore, we propose a framework to assess the
potential risk when part of the distributed system is compromised and detect those vulner-
abilities whose compromise can cause a severe impact on the power delivery system. The
objective is to help the construction of a more robust and secure communication network
for DSM from a topological perspective.
While this framework can help to assess the potential vulnerabilities of DSM commu-
nication network, it also assists to plan a more secure and robust communication network
infrastructure. The communication network designer can utilize the provided warnings and
reduce the risk by placing additional secure communication access points or encryption re-
sources. In addition, the study of risk assessment is also a starting point of automated and
optimal secure DSM communication network planning. From another angle, grid operator
can also utilize this framework to “patch” those vulnerable link of the power grid bearing
in mind that the communication network is not attack proof.
1.4 Outline of The Proposal
The proposal is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents existing works relating to our
research topics. Chapter 3 presents our work on privacy-cost savings tradeoff of an in-home
energy storage for a single user in demand response. Next, in Chapter 4, our research
regarding the end-user energy storage sharing is presented. Next, Chapter 5, presents our
research on quantitative Impact of DSM cyber attack. Finally, we conclude our research
and discuss promising future directions in Chapter 6.
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2. Related Works
2.1 Utility-Privacy Tradeoff of Energy Storage Management
Different approaches have been proposed to hide the information revealed through
smart metering data. When using a trusted escrow service, encryption and data aggregation
methods are studied in [23,24]. In the absence of trusted escrow, [25,26] propose “distorting”
the data to prevent information retrieval by shifting loads or filtering energy usage data
which is limited to the short time scale such as the exact time of switch action. A simple
stochastic battery policy using a storage device at home to distort the instantaneous energy
consumption while incurring zero delay is studied in [27]. But the fact that eavesdropper
can use observations to estimate the past energy consumption is neglected. One recent
approach to address the privacy preserving and cost saving tradeoff [28] defines privacy
as the “flatness” of power consumption profile and proposes an online control algorithm.
We note that “flatness” of a power profile is an indirect measure of privacy and their
approach cannot prevent an eavesdropper from successfully inferring a user’s electricity
profile when the battery control policy is available to the eavesdropper which is a key
assumption in this chapter. Entropy as used in this chapter is a direct measure of an
observer’s uncertainty, using which the primary purpose of this chapter is to characterize
the tradeoff between privacy and cost savings. There is another recent work [29] presents
the existence of tradeoff between privacy and energy efficiency through energy harvesting
and storage wherein a numerical analysis on an i.i.d. binary model is presented.
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2.2 Privacy Aware Management of Distributed End-user En-
ergy Storage Sharing
Different approaches have been proposed to provide cost savings through in-home
energy storage. The optimal cost saving policies for a single user in-home storage system
are studied in [5,6]. In [5], the authors model a system of an energy storage serving a single
user with joint Markov price and demand processes and a continuous state space. They
show that a threshold policy on the battery level is the optimal. In [6], the authors consider
a more complex model of a user with non-controllable renewable energy, an energy selling
back mechanism and a convenience utility.
The policies for energy storage sharing using a predetermined time-of-use pricing
scheme are studied in [30, 31]. With a finite horizon formulation, an optimal centralized
policy is proposed in [30]. In [31], a game theoretic approach is presented with a distributed
algorithm to determine each user’s energy production and storage a day-ahead. However,
counterparts of [30,31] in real time pricing scheme are still lacking. As the electricity stor-
age control is also stock management, it is related to the newsvendor model problem with
dynamic pricing [32]. But this model does not characterize the dynamics of multiple users
sharing one energy storage.
In addition to cost savings, an in-home battery can also provide privacy protection
of actual demand against smart metering’s detailed electricity usage monitoring. A simple
stochastic battery policy using a storage device at home to distort the instantaneous energy
consumption while incurring zero delay is studied in [27]. But the fact that eavesdropper
can use observations to estimate the past energy consumption is neglected. There is another
recent work [29] presents the existence of tradeoff between privacy and energy efficiency
through energy harvesting and storage wherein a numerical analysis on an i.i.d. binary
model is presented.
2.3 Quantitative Risk Assessment of Cyber Attack on DSM
In the context of AMI cyber security, the attacks studied in literature have focused
on user privacy risks [33, 34]. In the broader context of demand side management, data
injection attacks on a real-time electricity market was first presented in [35] and [36]. The
authors in [35] presented the financial risks induced by the malicious attack and proposed
a heuristic technique for finding a profitable attack. In [36], the authors introduced a
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geometric framework based on which upper and lower bounds on the optimal data attack
are obtained.
In [37], smart grid network topology attacks were first studied in which an adversary
intercepts network and meter data to mislead the control center with incorrect topology
information. The authors studied the condition for the existence of an undetectable attack
for strong adversaries who can observe all meter and network data and for weak adversaries
with only local information. They showed that with certain connectivity criteria satisfied,
undetectable attacks do not exist.
While there are similarities between [37] and our work, there are major differences. [37]
studied topology attacks in which the adversary is assumed to be destructive instead of
selfish with the objective to mislead the control center with incorrect topology information.
In addition, system monitoring constraints have not been considered in [37].
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3. Privacy Analysis of Battery Control Mechanisms
in Demand Response
DSM systems in the electricity grid, which rely on two way communication between
the consumers and utility, require the transmission of instantaneous energy consumption to
utilities. Perfect knowledge of a user’s power consumption profile by a utility is a violation
of privacy and can be detrimental to the successful implementation of demand response sys-
tems. It has been shown that an in-home energy storage system (such as a battery/inverter)
that provides a viable means to achieve the cost savings of instantaneous electricity pricing
without inconvenience can also be used to hide a user’s power usage pattern. A fundamen-
tal tradeoff exists between the costs saved and the degree of privacy achievable, and in this
work, the tradeoff achievable by a finite capacity battery assuming a zero tolerance for ac-
tivity delay is studied using a Markov process model for user’s demands and instantaneous
electricity prices. Due to high computational complexity (continuous state-action space) of
the stochastic control model, inner and upper bounds are presented on the optimal tradeoff.
In particular, a class of battery charging policies based on minimizing “revealing states” is
proposed to derive achievable privacy-cost savings tradeoffs. The performance of this algo-
rithm is compared with inner bounds derived using a greedy heuristic and upper bounds
derived using an information theoretic rate distortion approach. The framework proposed
is shown to be applicable even when users only desire partial information protection such
as presence/absence of activity or specific appliances they wish to hide.
3.1 Model
Consider a household consumer with stochastic energy requirements that can be sat-
isfied by direct purchase from the grid or by discharging an in-home battery. A pictorial
representation of the energy and information flow is shown in Fig. 3.1. Time and energy
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Figure 3.1: A graphical representation of the model
levels are assumed to be discretized. Specifically, let t = 1, 2, · · · denote the time slots over
an infinite horizon. Let {Dt ∈ D}, {Pt ∈ P}, {Bt ∈ B} denote the respective sequences of
random variables characterizing user’s demand, instantaneous price and battery evolution
process with finite supports. The demand and price are modeled using two Markovian
processes with initial state D1, P1 and transition probability p
D
i,j = Pr{Dt+1 = j|Dt = i},
pPi,j = Pr{Pt+1 = j|Pt = i} respectively. The battery level is controlled by the given policy
as will be explained subsequently. The notation Xt1 = X1, ..., Xt.
Policy: At denotes the units of electricity purchased by the user from the grid at time
t. The choice of At at time t can be random. Privacy necessitates creating uncertainty
in instantaneous demands from the eavesdropper’s perspective, which can be increased
by using probabilistic actions. Let Qt = {qt(d, b, a, p) = Pr{At = a|Dt = d,Bt = b, Pt =
p},∀b, d, p, a}, the probability distribution of purchasing At units of power given Dt units of
demand and battery level Bt. Let µt denote the function that maps all available knowledge
at time t to the probability distribution Qt, and let µ = µ1, µ2, · · · define the policy of the
user in determining the level of energy to be purchased.
A simple policy to provide privacy protection is to charge the battery when it is empty
and consume energy from the battery as long as it is not drained. This policy aggregates the
electricity usage during a period into one short pulse and hides the electricity pattern during
the discharging period. Although the intuitive policy provides some uncertainty (during
the discharge), it is limited by its determinism and does not adapt to price changes.
From the user’s point of view, instantaneous demand, price and battery level are
available at time t and consequently the user only has control on the probabilistic electricity
purchase action Qt at the specific state (b, d, p) ∈ B × D × P at time t. However, since
the utility is unaware of the demand at time t, an uncertainty exists from the perspective
of the utility over the present demand and battery level, and the privacy of the present
demand will depend on the complete conditional distribution of action given demand and
battery. Consequently, we pose the problem as one of optimizing the entire conditional
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distribution {Pr{At|Bt = b,Dt = d, Pt = p}, p ∈ P, d ∈ D, b ∈ B} as opposed to the point
conditional distribution.
Battery evolution: For the remainder of this chapter, the battery efficiency is as-
sumed to be perfect. Battery efficiency depends on the type of battery. We do note that
the major type of commercial use battery, Li-ion battery has a charging and discharging
efficiency close to 100% [38]. While this model does not completely capture the behavior of
all types of batteries in all applications, it does capture the influence of a controllable stor-
age to minimize information leakage through in-out traffic analysis, which is our primary
purpose.
We require that all demand must be met immediately from a combination of direct
purchase and battery discharging (zero delay inconvenience). So the battery level evolves:
Bt = Bt−1 +At−1 −Dt−1 (3.1)
Utility/Eavesdropper: We assume that anybody interested in compromising a user’s
privacy can observe At, the electricity purchased, and the energy price Pt at time t. The goal
of an eavesdropper is to estimate the full history of demands using all observations. We also
assume the eavesdropper has perfect information about the strategy used by the controller.
Since the strategy is random, the realization of the randomness used by the controller is
unavailable to the eavesdropper, and is an important factor in increasing privacy.
Privacy Measure: We quantify the privacy of user energy demand from an external
eavesdropper’s perspective using conditional entropy:
P(µ) = lim inf
t→∞
H(Dt1|At1, P t1)
t
. (3.2)
The conditional entropy for a pair of random vectors X¯, Y¯ ,
H(X¯|Y¯ ) = −
∑
x¯,y¯
Pr{X¯ = x¯, Y¯ = y¯} log Pr{X¯ = x¯|Y¯ = y¯}
is an accepted measure of privacy since it quantifies the uncertainty in X¯ from the per-
spective of an observer of Y¯ , and by virtue of Fano’s inequality [39], provides a good lower
bound to the observer’s probability of error in estimating X¯ from Y¯ . Our entropic measure
of privacy is computed based on the complete posterior distribution across time generated
by the policy given the set of observations. In other words the privacy defined as above
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assumes that an eavesdropper can use all future observations to determine the demand at
any time.
Expected Cost Savings: The instantaneous cost savings at time t is DtPt −AtPt −
CB(Bt+1−Bt)+ under the constraint of Bt ∈ B, Dt ∈ D, Pt ∈ P, where CB is the electricity
storage cost which reflects the battery purchase cost towards every 1 kWh electricity stored.
For mathematical convenience, we express the energy cost at each time slot as a function
of the key variables:
u(Dt, Bt+1, At, Pt) =
 DtPt −AtPt − CB(At −Dt)
+, Bt+1 ∈ B
−∞, Bt+1 /∈ B
We consider an infinite horizon average cost saving model in this chapter. Many of the
reductions presented can be incorporated into finite horizon models as well. The average
cost saving per time slot is given by:
U(µ) = lim inf
t→∞
E(
∑
t u(Dt, Bt+1, At, Pt))
t
where the expectation is over the realization of the demands and prices, and the probabilistic
strategy at each time slot.
Weighted Reward: In order to study the tradeoff between privacy and cost savings,
we define a weighted reward:
R(µ, λ) = λP(µ) + (1− λ)U(µ)
For desired weight λ ∈ [0, 1], our objective is to find the optimal weighted reward:
J∗(λ) = sup
µ
[λP(µ) + (1− λ)U(µ)]
and to design a policy that performs as close to the optimal tradeoff as possible. As long
as the cost saving function is bounded, the solution to the weighted reward optimization
is the same as the solution to privacy maximization with cost saving constraint (or cost
saving maximization with privacy constraint). Sweeping λ from 0 to 1, the tradeoff is
characterized. Users, depending on their preferences, can choose any operating point on
the tradeoff curve.
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3.2 A ρ-POMDP Formulation
The key to reducing the weighted optimization problem to the recursive Bellman equa-
tion form is in expressing the non-causal reward as a sum of instantaneous rewards, one at
each time step. In particular, this requires the instantaneous reward to be causal. While
the cost savings, by virtue of definition, is indeed a sum of costs earned at each step, the
privacy as defined in the previous section is not directly so. In the subsequent analysis, we
express the total privacy in terms of the sum of information leaked in every time step.
3.2.1 Privacy as a Stepwise Additive Metric
Using the chain rules of entropy and joint information [39], the privacy metric can be
transformed:
H(Dn|An, Pn) = H(An|Dn, Pn) +H(Dn|Pn)−H(An|Pn) (3.3)
Since the demand is assumed independent of price (zero delay assumption), we can rewrite
H(Dn|Pn) in (3.3) as:
H(Dn|Pn) = H(Dn) =
n∑
t=1
H(Dt|Dt−1) = nHD (3.4)
where HD is the entropy rate of the demand process. For any policy µ, the action at time
step t is only dependent on the past history up to time t and is necessarily independent of
the future demands Dnt+1 and prices P
n
t+1. Therefore H(A
n|Pn) can be expressed as:
H(An|Pn) =
n∑
t=1
H(At|At−1, Pn) =
n∑
t=1
H(At|At−1, P t)
Similarly, H(An|Dn, Pn) can be upper bounded by:
H(An|Dn, Pn) ≤
n∑
t=1
H(At|At−1, Dt, Bt, P t) (3.5)
Note that Bt =
∑t−1
τ=1Aτ −
∑t
τ=1Dτ +B1, and consequently entropy H(A
n|Dn, Pn) =∑n
t=1H(At|At−1, Dt, Bt, P t). Inequality (3.5) is due to the fact that conditioning reduces
entropy. Further note that if the policy at time t were independent of all past variables
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conditioned on Bt, Dt, P
t, At−1, then the upper bound in (3.5) is achieved. We can therefore
restrict ourselves to such Markov policies. Within this reduced class of policies,
we combine (3.4) - (3.5) with (3.3) to get:
H(Dn|An, Pn) =
n∑
t=1
[HD +H(At|At−1, P t, Dt, Bt)−H(At|At−1, P t)] (3.6)
Consequently, the privacy metric can be expressed as
P(µ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
E(rp(Dt, Bt, P t, At))
where:
rp(Dt, Bt, P
t, At) = HD +H(Dt, Bt|At, P t)−H(Dt, Bt|At−1, P t−1) (3.7)
which is indeed a causal instantaneous reward.
3.2.2 Dynamic Programming
The causal instantaneous reward as expressed in (3.7) is dependent on conditional
distributions with dimensions increasing across time (At−1, P t−1), which can be captured
using a belief vector that measures the probability distribution of state variables given
all past history. Since the instantaneous rewards are causal, the belief at every step can
be updated upon new actions and observations. We denote a prior distribution at the
beginning of time step t, piprt (d, b) = Pr{Dt = d,Bt = b|At−1 = at−1, P t−1 = pt−1}, and a
posterior probability distribution upon observing At, as pi
po
t (d, b) = Pr{Dt = d,Bt = b|At =
at, P t = pt}. Accordingly, the entropy term H(Dt, Bt|At−1, P t−1) is then the entropy of
the prior distribution and
H(Dt, Bt|At, P t) ≤ H(Dt, Bt|At, Pt, piprt ) (3.8)
is the entropy of the posterior distribution. Note that, as before, the inequality in (3.8)
can be achieved by making decisions solely based on present demand, battery, price sta-
tus and the prior probability distribution piprt . Therefore, we restrained ourselves to such
strategies, with which present demand, battery, price status are independent of past eaves-
dropper’s observation conditioned on the present observation At, Pt and knowledge of the
prior probability distribution piprt .
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Given a policy µ with the constraint that decision making is only based onDt, Bt, Pt, pi
pr
t ,
we can rewrite the conditional probability distribution of the amount of energy purchase
Qt = {qt(d, b, a) = Pr{At = a|Dt = d,Bt = b}, d ∈ D, b ∈ B, a ∈ A}. The evolution of prior
and post probability distribution can then be described recursively:
pi
po|a
t (d, b) =
piprt (d, b)qt(d, b, a)∑
d,b pi
pr
t (d, b)qt(d, b, a)
piprt+1(d¯, b¯) =
∑
d
pi
po|a
t (d, b)p
D
d,d¯, where b = b¯− a+ d (3.9)
d¯, b¯ is an arbitrary pair of demand and battery level at time t. Using the prior probability,
we can also acquire the probability distribution of energy purchase At, γt(a), conditioned
on the past energy purchase and price history:
γt(a) = Pr{At = a|At−1, P t} =
∑
d,b
piprt (d, b)qt(d, b, a)
The weighted reward at time slot t can then be expressed as:
Rλ(pi
pr
t , Qt) = λ [H(pi
po
t ) +HD −H(piprt )] + (1− λ) [piprt (d, b)qt(d, b, a)u(d, b, a, Pt)]
Using the technique in [40] (Chapter 6), we can write the Bellman equation for sta-
tionary strategies:
J∗ + ω(pipr) = sup
Q
{Rλ(pipr, Q) +
∑
a
γ(a)ω(pipo,aQ)} (3.10)
where ω(pipr) = limt→∞[Vt(pipr)− tJ∗], and:
Vt(pi
pr)
t
= sup
Q
{Rλ(pipr,Q) +
∑
a
γt(a)[Vt−1(pi
po,a
t ,Q)− Vt(pipr)] +
Vt(pi
pr)
t
}
If a unique solution to (3.10) exists, then it would be the unique optimal strategy which is
stationary. Note that the stationary strategy in this problem is a mapping µ : D×P ×B×
P(D × B) 7→ P(A) where P(S) is the probability simplex over space S. Further, different
from classic POMDP, the instantaneous reward here is non-linear and belief dependent
due to the entropy function. In general, computing the optimal stationary strategy and
finding the solution of the Bellman equation, if it exists, is computationally complex for
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continuous state-action spaces. In subsequent sections, we therefore study specific policies
to derive achievable inner bounds on the optimal tradeoff and use rate distortion theory to
provide outer bounds on the optimal tradeoff. Prior to presenting the bounds, we propose
an extension of this framework to study partial privacy in the application.
Privacy of Partial Information In some scenarios, a user may not be interested in
hiding the complete usage pattern in a home. Partial information such as “whether there
is a high power device running” or “whether the house is occupied or empty” alone may be
sufficient– privacy has always been a subjective idea. In the subsequent argument we show
that the framework described thus far can be adapted to study the privacy of a deterministic
function of demands as well.
Assuming the user’s requirement is not the protection of the exact demand process Dn
but instead the protection of the sequence of functions φ(D1)...φ(Dt)..., where
φ : D → Ω
where Ω is the space of the partial information of D. Consider a simple example wherein
a user wishes to hide his presence or absence. The sequence of indicator functions φ(Dt) =
1{Dt>0} would need to be protected. Similarly, for a given threshold Dth, a function φ(Dt) =
1 if Dt > Dth and φ(Dt) = 0 if Dt ≤ Dth can be used to represent the timing sequence of
high power demands.
Using similar techniques as in (3.3)-(3.6), we get:
Pφ(µ) = 1
n
n∑
t=1
[Hφ(Dt) +H(At|At−1, P t, φt(D))−H(At|At−1, P t)] (3.11)
where Hφ(Dt) is the entropy rate of φ(Dt) process. The average partial information
privacy protection of a given policy in a finite time horizon can be numerically calculated
by (3.11) while an upper bound can be provided using rate distortion optimization as will
be discussed in Section 3.4.2.
Based on the described framework, our key objective is to provide computable solutions
that are close to optimal for the general model with multiple levels of battery, price and
demand that any practical system can be approximated by. In the subsequent discussion, we
first study the greedy algorithm that optimizes the instantaneous tradeoff between privacy
protection and cost savings at every step. We then propose a “Battery Centering” policy
that aims to exploit the fact that minimum information is revealed when the purchase can
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be made probabilistically independent of demand. Upper bounds on the optimal privacy-
cost savings tradeoff are then derived using classical rate distortion theory.
3.3 A Greedy Algorithm
An intuitive sub optimal policy is to optimize the instantaneous reward. While the
greedy algorithm is not guaranteed to converge, the average reward obtained computation-
ally is expected to do so, and further the optimal policy is easy to calculate for each step
as a function of state and belief. The greedy optimal action distribution Q∗ for the greedy
policy is given by solving at each time step t:
Q∗ = arg sup
Q
{λ [H(pipot ) +HD −H(piprt )] + (1− λ) [piprt (d, b)qt(d, b, a)u(d, b, a, Pt)]}
Due to the convexity of the instantaneous reward, the greedy algorithm can be implemented
using iterative descent at every step to determine the optimal action and the belief in the
subsequent state. It is also possible to extend the greedy algorithm to provide partial
information protection. The instantaneous privacy reward in (3.11) can be bounded as:
rPφ(µ) ≤ Hφ(Dt) +H(At|pipr,1t , Pt, φt(D))−H(At|pipr,2t , Pt)
where pipr,1t = Pr{Dt, Bt|At−1, P t−1, φt(D)}
pipr,2t = Pr{Dt, Bt|At−1, P t−1}
as conditioning reduces entropy. The bound can be achieved by constraining At to be
independent of all past variables conditioned on Bt, Dt, pi
pr,1
t , pi
pr,2
t , Pt, φ(Dt). We therefore
restrict ourselves to such policies. Therefore, the greedy optimal action distribution Q∗greedy
for the partial information protection and cost savings is given by solving:
Q∗greedy =arg sup
Q
{(1− λ) [piprt (d, b)qt(d, b, a)u(d, b, a, Pt)]
+ λ
[
H(At|pipr,1t , Pt, φt(D)) +HD −H(At|pipr,2t , Pt)
]
}
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The greedy algorithm is a natural heuristic to avoid a global optimization over the
whole time horizon. In order to design a better algorithm that can balance the current
reward and future rewards, we propose a method that aims to create long term uncertainty
in the demand process by decoupling the probabilistic actions from the recurring demand
to the extent possible. Our numerical comparisons will demonstrate that the performance
of this strategy is much closer to the maximum possible in comparison with the greedy
algorithm.
3.4 A “Revealing State” Approach
In the entropy based stochastic control problem described in previous sections, the
battery and demand process are estimated jointly using the electricity purchase along the
complete time horizon. Note that if the battery level is at a medium level, the purchase
action Qt need not be constrained by either battery or demand. This is a desirable situation
where the system state can be hidden, and a good policy would let this situation persist
as long as possible. In contrast, if the battery reaches its maximum or minimum level, the
electricity purchase action Qt is severely constrained by the battery evolution (3.1) and
the resulting battery state estimation by the eavesdropper/utility will have high accuracy.
Such a situation reveals the state of the system to the eavesdropper and is expectedly
undesirable from a privacy perspective. This idea forms the motivation for the “battery
centering” policy described heretofore.
In the battery centering strategy, we classify the system state into three stages S(t) ∈
{0, 1, 2}. Assuming that battery starts from a medium level b0 in stage 0, the electricity
purchase action is made according to a probability distribution (3.12) which is independent
of battery level and demand until the battery reaches its maximum or minimum.
piAa (p) = Pr{at = a|Pt = p, p ∈ P} (3.12)
The system transfers to stage 1 if the battery reaches maximum or to stage 2 if the
battery reaches minimum. When the system is in stage 1 or 2, the electricity purchase is
respectively large enough or small enough so that the battery level can traverse back to
the medium point b0 to go back to stage 0 again. We refer to the time duration between
the system entering and leaving a stage as the staying time Tstay(t) = max{t2 − t1|S(k) =
S(t) if k, t ∈ [t1, t2)}.
At any time step t, we define the process to be in a hiding state if the purchase At
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Algorithm 1 “Battery Centering” Strategies
1: procedure Battery storage Bt maintaining
2: Initialization B0 = b0
3: System state ← Stage 0
4: while System state == Stage 0 do
5: generate at according to distribution pi
A
a (p)
6: if Bt + at −Dt ∈ B then
7: purchase At ← at
8: System state ← Stage 0
9: else if Bt + at −Dt > Bmax then
10: purchase At ← Bmax −Bt +Dt
11: System state ← Stage 1
12: else
13: purchase At ← Bmin −Bt +Dt
14: System state ← Stage 2
15: while System state == Stage 1 do
16: if Bt −Dt ≥ b0 then
17: purchase At ← 0
18: System state ← Stage 1
19: else
20: purchase At ← b0 −Bt +Dt
21: System state ← Stage 0
22: while System state == Stage 2 do
23: if Bt +Dmax −Dt ≤ b0 then
24: purchase At ← Dmax
25: System state ← Stage 2
26: else
27: purchase At ← b0 −Bt +Dt
28: System state ← Stage 0
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is independent of battery level Bt and demand Dt. For the Battery Centering policy, as
long as the stage of the battery remains fixed, the system remains in a hiding state. A
revealing state is defined to have occurred at time t if At is deterministically related to Bt
and Dt. For the Battery Centering policy, the system reaches a revealing state only when
the stage of the battery changes. As an example, when the system moves from stage 0
to stage 1, At = Bmax − Bt + Dt is a deterministic function of Bt and Dt. The resulting
battery state is fully revealed and it is a revealing state. For the Battery Centering policy,
the system remains in a hiding state until the battery stage changes at which point the
system hits a revealing state for one time step before reverting back to a hiding state.
Therefore, reducing the frequency of one will increase the frequency of the other. Our goal
is to therefore optimize the parameters of the policy so that the frequency of occurrence
of the revealing states is minimized. When the battery is in stage 1 or 2, this can be
accomplished by setting the purchase speed to 0 or Dmax respectively.
Although the proposed algorithm can be used for any demand and price evolution
model, the analytical optimization of the parameters of the algorithm is facilitated when
the underlying model is i.i.d.. In the following, we assume i.i.d. underlying models and
present the mathematical background to maximize the staying time Tstay(t) of stage 0 in
the system for this class of policies.
Lemma 1. The battery level evolution in every stage of Algorithm 1 is equivalent to a
bounded random walk process:
Stage 0: Bt+1 = B1 +X
0
1 + ...+X
0
t , with Pr(X
0
t = x) =
∑
a,d,p|a−d=x[pi
A
a (p)p
D
d p
P
p ]
Stage 1: Bt+1 = B1 +X
1
1 + ...+X
1
t , with Pr(X
1
t = x) = p
D−x
Stage 2: Bt+1 = B1 +X
2
1 + ...+X
2
t , with Pr(X
2
t = x) = p
D
Dmax−x
Proof: This lemma follows if we treat the difference of battery level in every time slot
as the random step. As Xit , i = 0, 1, 2 are i.i.d. in each stage and their sums
∑t
τ=t0
Xiτ +Bt0
are typical random walks.
Theorem 2. For battery centering strategies described in Algorithm 1, if E a =
∑
a∈A,i∈P
apiAa (i)p
P
i 6= ED then E |Bt − b0| = O(t). If E a = ED then E |Bt − b0| = O(
√
t).
Proof: Lemma 1 ensures that the movement of the states can be modeled as a random
walk. According to the result in Chapter 2, [41], the distance between a random walk at
time t and the original position at time 0 is O(t) if it is a biased walk or O(
√
t) if it is an
unbiased walk. For a random walk with step X0t = at −Dt, E |Bt − b0| = O(t) if EX0t 6= 0;
E |Bt− b0| = O(
√
t) if EX0t = 0. As the electricity purchase amount is fixed at 0 and Dmax
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in stage 1 and 2 respectively in Algorithm 1, the expected staying time is fixed. Therefore,
in order to reduce the frequency of “revealing” state, we design piAa (p) in such a way that
E a = ED.
In addition, as the equivalent random walk in stage 0 is unbiased, we want to maximize
min{|Bmax − b0|, |Bmin − b0|} to increase the staying time in stage 0 which results in b0 =
1
2(Bmax +Bmin).
Theorem 3. For battery centering strategies described in Algorithm 1, the frequency of
revealing state increases with σa.
Proof: Following Lemma 1, the battery level process in stage 0 is equivalent to a
random walk process with step move X0t = at − Dt. Therefore, we have an estimation
of battery level at time t: Pr(Bt − b0 = k) ' {2piσ2X00 t}
−0.5 exp{− k2
2piσ2
X00
t
} according to
Central Limit Theorem [41]. Noticing that at is independent of Dt, which leads to σ
2
X0t
=
σ2at +σ
2
Dt
. With these argument, we can notice that the increase of σa will lead the increase
of Pr(Bt − b0 ≥ Bmax − b0 or Bt − b0 ≤ Bmin − b0). Theorem 3 then follows.
The above theorem proves that reducing the variance of X0t will increase the time
spent at stage 0. Therefore, minimizing σX0t = σat can minimize the frequency of system
traversing from one stage to another and consequently the frequency with which a system
state is revealed to the eavesdropper. Such an approach would work very well if cost savings
were not a consideration. In order to trade cost savings for privacy, the electricity purchase
needs to depend on the price, which would in turn increase σat . Optimizing the tradeoff
between privacy and cost savings is equivalent to optimizing the privacy protection with
different minimum cost savings constraint. Using theorems 2 and 3, the optimization of
privacy with cost savings constraint using the battery centering strategies can be solved by
linear programming (see (3.13)) to minimize σa given equality constraint E a = ED and
inequality constraint E ap ≤ s, where s sweeps from EDPmin to EDEP .
minimize
∑
a∈A,i∈P
(a− ED)2piAa (i)pPi (3.13)
subject to
∑
a∈A,i∈P
apiAa (i)p
P
i = ED,
∑
a∈A,i∈P
appiAa (i)p
P
i ≤ s
The proposed battery centering algorithm is an easily stated policy and can be im-
plemented in practice by keeping track of the battery “stage” while the determination of
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electricity purchase At is either generated according to a predetermined probability distri-
bution or the result of a simple computation.
3.4.1 Analysis of “Battery Centering” Strategy
When implementing Algorithm 1 on a system with multiple albeit finite levels of battery
state, demand and price, piprt follows a positive recurrent Markov Chain with countable
states. It is easily verified that revealing states are indeed positive recurrent states. Based
on this fact, we can calculate the expected privacy and cost savings of strategy Algorithm 1
numerically. Under i.i.d. assumptions, we can also calculate the expected privacy and cost
savings analytically for the battery centering strategy with given parameters using random
walk theory as follows.
Step 1 Calculate the expected step privacy of every stage. Denote the time between
two revealing state as ηi. By the definition of expected step privacy in each stage, the law
of conditional entropy and the facts that ηi is totally dependent on Dn and demand is i.i.d..
We have:
E riP = HD − E
H(ηi)
E ηi
Step 2 The expected privacy of the complete time horizon
E rP = HD − 2EH(η
0) + EH(η1) + EH(η2)
2E η0 + E η1 + E η2
(3.14)
Equation (3.14) is due to the fact that random walk of stage 0 is unbiased and will end
in stage 1 or 2 with equal likelihood while stage 1 and stage 2 will always end in stage 0.
Step 3 The expected cost savings:
E rS =
2E η0[
∑
p∈P,d∈D piP (p)piD(d)−
∑
p∈P fa(p)ppiP (p)]
2E η0 + E η1 + E η2
where E rS is the expected cost savings over the complete time horizon. It is known that
the accurate analysis of η for general step distribution is an open problem [41].
3.4.2 Upper Bound
In order to evaluate the closeness to optimality of the proposed battery centering
strategies, we provide an upper bound by considering a weak eavesdropper who does not
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update his belief. We appeal to the fact that conditioning reduces entropy [39] to limit the
information used by the eavesdropper. Specifically, removing the conditioning variables that
the eavesdropper uses to determine the state can increase the entropy achievable without
compromising the costs. Indeed, if we assume the eavesdropper only uses observations of m
previous steps, then the maximum privacy achievable against such an eavesdropper will be
an upper bound on that achievable by any policy against the original eavesdropper (3.2).
P(µ) ≤ sup
PAm1 |Dm1 (a
m
1 |dm1 )
H(Dm1 |Am1 , Pm1 )
m
Under this model, the resulting system is an m−horizon problem and we make one more
additional assumption that the entire m−horizon demand and price realization is available
to the controller at the time of optimization (non-causality). The optimal weighted reward
achievable by a non-causal controller against a weakened eavesdropper will provide a strict
upper bound on any tradeoff achievable for the original problem. Under these assumptions,
this problem is a variant of classical rate distortion minimization [39].
R(µ, λ) ≤ 1
m
[λH(Dm1 ) + (1− λ)(
m∑
t=1
DtPt +Bm)
− min
PAm1 |Dm1 (a
m
1 |dm1 )
(λI(Am1 ;D
m
1 |Pm1 ) + (1− λ)
m∑
t=1
AtPt + CB(At −Dt)+)] (3.15)
where min I(Am1 ;D
m
1 |Pm1 ) is the minimum mutual information rate between Dm1 and Am1
given the constraint posed by battery evolution which are easily computed using standard
convex optimization techniques. The generalized Blahut-Arimoto algorithm provided in [42]
provides an efficient computational technique to obtain the upper bound in (3.15). The
upper bound thus derived forms a fundamental limit to the privacy-cost savings tradeoff.
3.5 A Numerical Example
In this section, we validate our theoretical results through numerical simulations using
real electricity usage and pricing data to demonstrate that the battery centering algorithm
optimized by the revealing state approach works well in practice. Specifically we use the
electricity usage data of a home [43] and the time-of-use pricing data published by NY
ISO [44]. The electricity usage is discretized into 20 levels and price is discretized into 10
levels. We assume that an electricity storage is available to provide both privacy protection
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and cost savings. Both the system and eavesdropper treat the demand process Dt and price
process Pt as i.i.d.. Fig. 3.2 presents the activity of the energy storage system with capacity
of 2 kWh and $ 0.02 per kWh energy storage cost using the battery centering algorithm
and the greedy algorithm. As it is a relatively small electricity consumer with a peak power
consumption of only 1.5 kW, a battery with 2 kWh is reasonable in this case. With battery
centering algorithm, the privacy was well protected as the battery level touched its limit
only twice and revealing states occurred on an average about 4 times in a total 48 hours.
The privacy P/HD = 0.992 while the cost is reduced by 15.87%. However, with the same
cost savings requirement, the greedy algorithm performed much worse, P/HD = 0.857.
The privacy-cost savings tradeoff of battery centering algorithm is presented in Fig.
3.3 when battery capacity is 0.5, 1, 2 kWh. We only plot privacy-cost savings tradeoff
of greedy algorithm when battery capacity is 2 kWh. The upper bound is calculated
using a 4-step horizon rate distortion computation. The presented results demonstrate the
closeness in performance of the battery centering policy to the fundamental limit in real
cases. Furthermore, even when utilized with a cost savings first requirement, the policy
provides substantial privacy. We also plot the point of cost savings optimal algorithm in [5]
in Fig. 3.3 as a comparison. The proposed algorithm is shown to provide substantial privacy
protection with very little savings reduction.
We also investigated partial information leakage where the partial information function
φ(Dt) is defined as:
φ(Dt) =

0 if Dt < 200W
1 if 200W ≤ Dt ≤ 1000W
2 if Dt > 1000W
(3.16)
Fig. 3.4 presents the partial information protection and cost savings tradeoff of the greedy
algorithm and battery centering algorithm when the battery capacity is 0.5, 2, 4 kWh based
on numerical computation method of partial information protection described in (3.11).
Upper bound is provided by the rate distortion technique. It shows that the performance
of our proposed battery centering algorithm can provide slightly better partial information
protection compared to the greedy algorithm and both algorithms can provide good partial
information protection with large capacity battery. The relatively worse performance when
battery capacity is limited is due to the fact that the battery centering algorithm is not
explicitly designed to treat demand levels differently, and the rate distortion upper bound
exacerbates the eavesdroppers weak prior information.
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Figure 3.2: The system activity with an energy storage of 2 kWh
3.6 Summary
Although the policy that solves the optimal tradeoff between privacy and cost savings
remains an open problem, we believe that our bounds using the revealing state approach are
quite close. While an in home battery provides an individual with the opportunity to make
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Figure 3.3: Privacy-cost savings for a real system
a choice about an operating point on the price-privacy curve, we believe that aggregation of
demand with larger batteries would be an interesting new dimension to explore, particularly
with the possibility of users have differing requirements and shared resources. Operating
costs are an important consideration for the mechanism proposed in this chapter. While
the key mathematical contributions in this chapter do not consider operating costs, the
framework does not preclude such costs per se. For instance, a marginal amount can be
added to the purchase price when charging the battery, and a marginal cost incurred every
time the battery is discharged. The policy simulated with these inclusions would provide a
tradeoff that is closer to practice.
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4. Privacy Aware Management of Distributed End-
user Energy Storage Sharing
Deregulated electricity markets with time varying electricity prices and opportunities
for consumer cost mitigation makes energy storage such as a battery an attractive proposi-
tion. Sharing a large capacity battery across a group of homes in a community, can not only
alleviate the economic deterrents but also exploit the fact that users’ activity patterns do
not necessarily overlap. However, battery sharing induces competition for battery capacity
between the users in general as they may want to maximize their own cost savings by occu-
pying more battery capacity when the electricity price is low. Importantly, users might have
privacy concerns when they communicate with the shared battery controller. The privacy
aware management of such a shared battery is the focus of this work. A game theoretical
framework was proposed to capture the competitive behaviors of users sending messages
through a communication network to an independent battery controller with an infinite
horizon limiting average signaling game formulation. The privacy requirement serves as
a constraint on messaging behaviors. The battery controller manages the charging and
discharging based on the received, albeit incomplete, information transmission. With such
a framework, we study the battery sharing when users are cooperative and completely pri-
vate. When the privacy requirement is relaxed, the competitive behaviors of users sending
messages to the battery controller is studied. A credit based battery management strategy
is designed for the battery controller to ensure an equilibrium of the game and achieves the
social optimality. However, the credit based battery management requires long time estab-
lished observations and may also “coerce” users to share their energy demands accurately
with the controller. We therefore, propose, a class of stationary suboptimal privacy preserv-
ing battery management strategy in which the message set being restricted to be completely
private or partially private. In addition, we demonstrate that by changing the size of the
message set, different pairs of preserved privacy and cost savings can be achieved. Through
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numerical simulations on real electricity pricing and usage data, we demonstrate the cost
effectiveness of battery capacity sharing and the tradeoff between privacy preserving and
cost mitigation using privacy preserving battery management strategy.
4.1 System Model and Stochastic Game Formulation
4.1.1 Operational Model
In this work, we consider the management of an energy storage system shared by n
household as demonstrated in Fig. 4.1. As the electricity price is changing in real time,
users want to take advantage of the energy storage system to cut their energy cost. Without
any sacrifice of the convenience, a user’s energy demand must be satisfied instantaneously
from the combination of real time purchase from the grid and battery discharging. However,
as a shared property, such energy storage is installed independent of any users. Therefore,
instead of controlling the energy storage directly, the users rely on an independent battery
controller to manage the storage on behalf of the commonwealth of users. At every time
step, the battery controller decides the electricity storage level maintained for each user,
then purchase or sell back electricity on behalf of each user to achieve the designated storage
level. We make two assumptions on the electricity sell back mechanism:
• Although energy is stored in the battery separately for each user, the stored energy
can be traded among users.
• The stored electricity can be sold back to the grid – a policy referred to as net metering
which is widely permitted in the US.
For simplicity and fairness, we assume the electricity trading price is identical to the price
from the grid at the time of trading.
The controller relies on not only battery state and pricing information to make the
optimal battery management decision, but also the real time energy demands of users. Since
the shared battery is installed separately from the users, monitoring their demands directly
is not realistic. With a more feasible formulation, the battery controller communicates with
the users via data links as shown in Fig. 4.1. Ideally, the users notify the controller the
actual energy demands so that the social optimality is achieved. However, the messages
from the users may not be complete or honest for two reasons:
• To occupy more battery capacity when electricity price is low to gain unfair amount
of cost savings. For instance, when the battery controller trusts all users, a user
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Figure 4.1: A battery sharing system with multiple users and the directional energy flow
can occupy more capacity by reporting a fake demand or internal state so that the
controller believes that its demand will increase rapidly in the near future.
• To hide the actual electricity consumption from the battery controller for privacy
concerns. As demonstrated in [4], user’s in-home activities can be analyzed using
appliance signatures.
Therefore, we don’t make any assumptions on the messages transmitted from the users
to the battery controllers. The messages can carry no information in the “blind” battery
management strategy as shown in Section 4.3.3. The messages can also be equivalent to the
actual energy demands in the cooperative battery management as shown in Section 4.3.1.
The use of the messages depends on the strategy and privacy preference of the user.
Our approach in this work is to build a stochastic game theoretical framework to
understand equilibrium policies for the users and controller. Privacy preserving battery
management can be realized by constraining the message set to be partially private. When
the privacy is not a concern, the social optimal cost savings can be achieved with a carefully
designed battery management strategy which ensures the equilibrium of the battery sharing
game.
4.1.2 The Stochastic Game Model
The game theoretical model for n users with a shared battery is formulated as below
where time and energy level are assumed to be discrete. Let t = 1, 2, ... denote the time
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slots over an infinite horizon.
Core State: Based on a common setup in [6, 7, 30], we use a core state ωt ∈ Ω
to describe the environmental state including the weather, the temperature, the time of
the day and etc. Users’ energy demands and electricity price are partially determined by
the core state ωt, which is a Markovian process with initial state ω0 and the transition
probability PΩ(ω, ω
′) = Pr(ωt+1 = ω′|ωt = ω).
Electricity Price: We use Pt ∈ P to denote the sequence of random variables char-
acterizing the instantaneous electricity price with finite supports:
Pt = γP (ωt) + δ
P
t
The price contains two components in which, γP (ωt) is the environment dependent com-
ponent of electricity price and δPt is the independent unforeseeable component. γP (·) is a
function describing the predictable power generation under given environment and its re-
sulting electricity price. δPt ∈ ∆P is a Markovian process with initial state δP0 and transition
probability P∆P (δ
P , δP
′
) = Pr(δPt+1 = δ
P ′|δPt = δP ).
We assume that electricity price Pt is a public information available to both users and
the battery controller.
Users: In this work, we consider n users whose energy demands also contain the
environment dependent component and the independent unforeseeable additives:
Dit = γi(ωt) + δ
i
t,∀i = 1, ..., n
where γi(·) is the function describing the user’s environment deciding energy demand. δit ∈
∆i is the unforeseeable component of demand which follows a Markovian process with
initial state δi0 and transition probability P∆i(δ
i, δi
′
) = Pr(δit+1 = δ
i′|δit = δi). We define
δt = {δ1t , · · · , δnt , δPt } to characterize the system condition at time t.
Though the demand Dit is private information only accessible by the user i itself, its
statistical properties γi and P∆i are assumed to be known by the battery controller.
All Markovian processes ωt, δ
i
t, ∀i discussed in this work are assumed to be aperiodic
and irreducible.
Battery: In order to alleviate the cost burden when taking advantage of the time
varying prices, the users share a battery with limited capacity. For the sake of analytical
convenience, we assume that the possible levels of storage in the battery have finite support
B. Bit denotes the energy storage level for user i at time t which is a private information
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only shared between the battery controller and user i. We have no additional constraints
on Bit except B
i
t ∈ B and
∑n
i=1B
i
t ∈ B since the storage capacity can be shared among
users. Bt = {B1t , · · · , Bnt } is referred to as the state of the battery at time t.
The battery efficiency is assumed to be perfect. Although battery efficiency can vary
depending on the type of battery, we do note that the major type of commercial use battery,
Li-ion battery has a charging and discharging efficiency close to 100% [38]. We don’t put
constraint on the battery charging and discharging speed since common residential circuit
capacity permits the full charging and discharging of a typical capacity energy storage in
an hourly base.
Battery Controller: Since the battery is a shared property, it is managed by an
independent controller on behalf of the common wealth of the users. The controller decides
the energy storage level to be maintained for each user Bit+1. To distinguish the difference
between the battery management action and energy storage level, we use βit = B
i
t+1 to
denote the decision of the battery controller for user i. βt = {β1t , · · · , βnt } is referred to as
the overall action of the battery controller.
To optimally manage the battery, the controller relies on public information – core state
ωt and electricity price Pt – and the private messages sent by individual users. While this
is a more realistic assumption, it enables the users to compete for maximum cost reduction
and arises the concern of privacy leakage through the message transmission.
Electricity Cost: As we stated in Section 4.1.A, the electricity price is unified as Pt
for electricity purchase from the grid, electricity sell back and in-battery energy trading at
time t. Therefore the electricity cost for user i at time t would be U it and is determined by:
U it = u(D
i
t, Pt, B
i
t, B
i
t+1) = Pt(D
i
t +B
i
t+1 −Bit) (4.1)
Privacy Aware Messaging: To communicate with the battery controller, users
send private messages M it over the communication network which are only observable by
transmitters and the receiver. To reflect different possibilities of users’ messaging behavior,
we don’t make assumptions on the message M it except that the message set Mi should be
finite and discrete. Two basic types of messaging behaviors have been studied in Section
4.3: Complete honest messaging and zero information messaging.
When the users actively choose the messaging strategy instead of following a prefixed
protocol, they can be competitive for the battery capacity or reluctant to reveal enough
information for privacy concern. If the electricity cost is the top concern of users, we show
that there exists an equilibrium where users are coerced to be honest and comprehensive on
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Figure 4.2: The decision making process
Dit or δ
i
t, and the battery controller is actively monitoring the messages M
i
t for credibility.
When the users and the battery controller have an agreement on the privacy concern, a
class of partially private messaging strategies can be used, where |Mi| < |∆i|. For example,
Mi = {High, Low}. In this setup, a message M it only delivers an ambiguous information of
Dit and δ
i. We also present the optimal battery management assuming the message setMi
are restricted to be partially private |Mi| < |∆i| and certain messaging strategies of users
are being acknowledged and accepted between the controller and the user. Performance
comparison is presented among different privacy preserved messaging setups.
Strategies: The order of decision making in each time slot is illustrated in the
flowchart shown in Fig. 4.2. In each time slot, the battery controller first collects mes-
sages from users and then make the battery management decision. In this work, we don’t
constrain ourselves to pure strategies or stationary strategies.
We let µit(ω0, P0, B
i
0, δ
i
0, ..., ωt, Pt, B
i
t, δ
i
t) denote the function that maps all available
knowledge of user i at time t to the messaging action M it , and let µ
i = µi0, µ
i
1, ... denote the
dynamic strategy of the user i. The available knowledge includes public information: core
state ωt, pricing Pt, its own private states: independent demand component δ
i
t, electricity
demand Dit, battery storage B
i
t and history records.
On the other hand, the battery controller manages the battery storage for each user
but only has access to public information ωt, Pt, the messages sent by the users Mt =
{M it |i = 1, ..., n}, battery state Bt and history records. We let µC = µC0 , µC1 , ... denote
the dynamic strategy of the controller where µCt (ω0, P0,B0,M0, ..., ωt, Pt,Bt,Mt) denote
the function that maps all available knowledge of the controller at time t to the battery
management action βt.
Privacy Metric To evaluate the users’ privacy quantitatively, we use Shannon’s equiv-
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ocation [9] to characterize the uncertainty of the electricity demands preserved from the
message receiver’s perspective:
rp(µ
i) = lim
τ→∞
1
τ
H(Di1, ..., D
i
τ |ω0,M i1, ..., ωτ ,M iτ ) (4.2)
where H(·|·) denotes the conditional entropy.
The mathematical notations used through this work are summarized in Table. 4.1
while some notations only used in one section are not included due to space limit.
t = 1, 2, ... Time
ωt ∈ Ω Core state at time t
Pt ∈ P Electricity price at time t
γP (·) Environment deciding price function
δPt ∈ ∆P Unforeseeable price fluctuation
Dit ∈ D Electricity demand of user i at time t
γi(·) Environment deciding demand function for user i
δit ∈ ∆i Unforeseeable demand fluctuation for user i
δt The composite unforeseeable system condition δt =
{δ1t , · · · , δnt , δPt }
P∆i ,PΩ Transition matrix of Markovian process δ
i
t and ωt
φt ∈ Φ The composite system state φt = {ωt, δt}
Bit ∈ B Energy storage level for user i
Bt the state of the battery Bt = {B1t , · · · , Bnt }
βit ∈ B Battery management decision for user i by the controller
U it the electricity cost for user i at time t
M it ∈Mi Messages sent from user i
µi The messaging strategy for user i
µC The battery management strategy for the controller
µ the composite strategies by all players including users and
the battery controller
rp(µ
i) Privacy preserved for user i with messaging strategy µi
rip Minimum privacy requirement of user i
U iµ(ω0, δ0,B0) Limiting average electricity cost of user i
λi Weight assigned to cost of user i
Rµ(ω0, δ0,B0) Weighted sum of electricity costs
ρ ∈ [0, 1) Discount factor
Table 4.1: Summary of Notations
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4.2 A Stochastic Signaling Game Formulation
In this section, we build a game theoretical framework to capture the competitive
messaging behaviors of users in the energy storage sharing with requirements on privacy
preserving. Upon this framework, we can study different messaging strategies of users and
the corresponding optimal battery managements. When the privacy requirement is relaxed,
a Nash equilibrium point is presented to achieve the social optimality.
We model the long term electricity costs of users using a limiting average formulation
and it is given by:
U iµ(ω0, δ0,B0) = E lim sup
T→∞
∑T
t=0 u(D
i
t, Pt, B
i
t, B
i
t+1)
T
(4.3)
which is a function of system states ω0, δ0,B0. µ = {µi|i = 1, ..., n, C} denotes the messag-
ing strategies by all players including users and the battery controller. The expectation is
over all possible realizations of the system states and the randomized strategies.
Though the energy storage system is a shared property, different users may have differ-
ent priorities to the shared battery since the purchase and maintenance costs of the battery
could be divided unequally across them. Consequently, we want to characterize the achiev-
able cost savings region in which each point corresponds to a simultaneously achievable
set of cost-savings for the group of users. Depending on the users’ priority, the energy
storage sharing system can operate at any point in the region. To study this cost savings
region among different users, we define a weighted cost with weight λi ∈ [0, 1] for user i
and
∑n
i=1 λ
i = 1:
Rµ(ω0, δ0,B0) =
n∑
i=1
λiU iµ(ω0, δ0,B0) (4.4)
By swapping λi, i = 1, . . . , n in its feasible region, different users’ priority pairs can be
characterized.
Assumed to be rational, each user aims to minimize its own electricity cost individually
by choosing appropriate messaging strategies with privacy preserving requirement:
minimize
µi
U iµ(ω0, δ0,B0) (4.5)
subject to: µi s.t. M it ∈Mi,∀t
rp(µ
i) >= rip
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where rip denotes the requirement on the privacy preserving.
When the privacy is a concern, rip > 0, the battery controller can not completely deter-
mine the actual energy demands by observing the messages and other public information.
However, when the privacy is not a concern, rip = 0, the second constraint of (4.5) is sat-
isfied by default. Note that, independent of the privacy concern, the user’s electricity cost
as modeled in (4.5) always incentivize dishonest reporting for additional cost savings.
On the other hand, the battery controller aims to minimize the weighted cost (4.4)
based on the information available and messages received:
minimize
µC
Rµ(ω0, δ0,B0) =
n∑
i=1
λiU iµ(ω0, δ0,B0) (4.6)
subject to: µC s.t. Bit ∈ B, ∀i,
n∑
i=1
Bit ∈ B, ∀t
Since the cost function is bounded, the weighted cost optimization is equivalent to the
constrained optimization of one user’s cost with inequality constraints on others’ costs [45].
Sweeping λi, i = 1, . . . , n across its valid region which is a n-simplex, the achievable cost
savings region can be characterized completely.
When privacy is not a concern and all users act honestly, the battery sharing becomes
a centralized management problem which is studied in Section 4.3.1. In contrast, when
privacy is the top priority, the messages carry minimal information about the users’ actual
electricity usage. The battery sharing becomes a message blind management problem which
is studied in Section 4.3.3.
The focus of this work is to study the battery management when all players aim to
minimize their own objectives individually. The battery sharing is a general sum, multi-
player limiting average signaling game. The equilibrium of this category of stochastic
games usually does not exist or is difficult to find even if it exists. However, if the privacy
requirement is relaxed rip = 0, due to the relatively advantageous position of the battery
controller, we shall demonstrate that a Nash equilibrium exists in this game using a non
stationary strategy, and furthermore, the performance is identical to that of the optimal
demand aware centralized energy management system.
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4.3 Complete Honest and Maximum Privacy Messaging
Before we present our results on the equilibrium point of the stochastic messaging
game of battery sharing, we first study two special cases of users’ messaging strategy and
the corresponding optimal battery management strategy. Though they are not necessary
results of our stochastic game equilibrium analysis in Section 4.4, they help to illustrate
the structure of the proposed credit based battery management strategy which ensures the
game equilibrium and the social optimality.
4.3.1 A Lower Bound On The Weighted Cost Summation: Centralized
Battery Management
To characterize the upper bound of the social welfare or the lower bound of the weighted
summation of users’ cost Rµ(ω0, δ0,B0), we assume that none of the users desire privacy
and they are completely honest and comprehensive to the battery controller about their
unforeseeable demand component δit.
µi∗ : M it = δ
i
t, i = 1, ..., n (4.7)
The battery management strategy µC can now utilize the users’ demand informa-
tion Dit directly, µ
C
t
(
ω0, P0,B0, D
i
0, . . . , ωt, Pt,Bt, D
i
t, i = 1, ..., n
)
which is equivalent to
µCt (ω0, δ0,B0, ..., ωt, δt,Bt).
A discounted cost formulation approach: To derive the corresponding optimal
battery management strategy µC†, we first study the ρ-discounted cost formulation. The
weighted cost in the ρ-discounted formulation is written as:
Rρ,µC (ω0, δ0,B0) =
n∑
i=1
ρi
[
lim
T→∞
E
T∑
t=0
λiU it
]
(4.8)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor. Since the immediate cost function (4.1) is always
bounded, the average weighted cost for any policy µC always exists. The battery manage-
ment optimization in limiting average formulation can be approximated by ρ-discounted
weighted cost formulation when ρ→ 1. Our objective is to find the optimal weighted cost:
R∗ρ,µC (ω0, δ0,B0) = infµ Rρ,µC (ω0, δ0,B0) (4.9)
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and the policy µC†ρ that minimizes the cost.
Such an optimization can be formulated as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) with
state (ωt, δt,Bt), action βt, transition
Pr(ωt+1, δ
i
t+1, Bt+1|ωt, Bt,βt)
=
 PΩ(ωt, ωt+1)ΠP∆i(δt, δt+1), Bt+1 = βt0, o.w. (4.10)
discount factor ρ and immediate cost function:
r(ωt, δt, bt,βt) =
n∑
i=1
λi(dit + β
i
t − bit)pt. (4.11)
For a Markov decision process with finite state space and bounded immediate cost function,
proposition 1.2.3 in [46], proves that the optimal policy is stationary and given by the
solution to the following fixed point equation.
J(ω, δ, b) = inf
β
r(ωt, δt, bt,βt)
+ ρ
∑
ω′,δ′
PΩ(ω, ω
′)ΠP∆i(δt, δt+1)J(ω
′, δ′,β) (4.12)
where β = µC(ω, δ, b), β′ = µC(ω′, δ′,β).
This Bellman equation can be solved using value iteration method which can be time
consuming because the state space and action space grow exponentially with number of
users. But if there exist specific structures on the optimal policy, the problem solving time
can be significantly simplified. In this work, we present a linear programming solution for
centralized battery management which significantly reduced the computation complexity.
Structure of optimal policy: Minimizing the discounted weighted cost (4.8) yields
an optimal policy structure in which the cost minimizing choice for user’s battery level
µC†ρ (ω, δ, b) is always independent of b as shown in Fig.4.3:
Lemma 4. There exists function µC†ρ (ω, δ) independent of b such that the optimal policy
that solves the Bellman equation (4.12):
µC†ρ (ω, δ, b) = µ
C†
ρ (ω, δ) (4.13)
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Figure 4.3: The optimal centralized battery management strategy structure
Proof: First, we prove that the minimal discounted weighted cost function
J(ω, b) = inf
β∈CβA(ω,b) or CβB(ω,b)
C(ω, b,β) is convex on b.
C
β
A(ω, b) = {β ∈ Bn|
∑n
i=1 β
i ∈ B}
C
β
B(ω, b) = {β ∈ Bn|
∑n
i=1 β
i ∈ B,∑ni=1 βi − bi + di ≥ 0}.
Assume the minimal total discounted weighted cost is J(ω, b) = infβ(ω,b)∈Uβ C(ω, b,β(ω,
b)), where Uβ = {β ∈ Bn|
∑n
i=1 β
i ∈ B} and define:
H(ω, b,β) = c(ω, b,β) + ρ
∑
ω′
PΩ(ω, ω
′)J(ω′,β) (4.14)
The Bellman equation states that:
J(ω, b) = inf
β∈Uβ
H(ω, b,β) (4.15)
Let Jn(ω, b) denote the minimal n-step discounted weighted cost starting from state
ω and battery level b. Similar to (4.14), define
Hn(ω, b,β) = c(ω, b,β) + ρ
∑
ω′
PΩ(ω, ω
′)Jn−1(ω′,β)
Then, Jn(ω, b) satisfies
Jn(ω, b) = inf
β∈Uβ
Hn(ω, b,β)
This series of finite-horizon costs converge as limn→∞ Jn(ω, b) = J(ω, b). Thus, in order
to show that J(ω, b) is convex, it is sufficient to show by induction that this holds for all
J(ω, b).
When n = 0, it is trivial that J0(ω, b) = 0 is convex. Assume that Jn−1(ω, b) is
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convex on b. c(ω, b,β) is linear and therefore convex. Hn(ω, b,β) is convex as it is a linear
combination of convex functions (4.14). By induction, Jn(ω, b) = infβ∈Uβ H
n(ω, b,β) is
convex on b.
Now we know that J(ω, b) is a convex function over b, so is the H(ω, b,β) over β as
c(ω, b,β) and J(ω′,β) in (4.14) are both convex on β. The partial derivative of H(ω, b,β)
to βi is given by:
∂H(ω, b,β)
∂βi
= λip+ ρ
∑
ω′
PΩ(ω, ω
′)
∂J(ω′,β)
∂βi
(4.16)
which is independent of b. Therefore the gradient ∇βH(ω, b,β) = (∂H(ω,b,β)∂β1 , ...,
∂H(ω,b,β)
∂βn
)
is also independent of b.
As H(ω, b,β) is convex on β and the gradient ∇βH(ω, b,β) is independent of b, the
optimal policy would be independent of b, β∗(ω, b) = B∗(ω), if following such policy would
satisfy the constraint CA. Particularly, No selling back constraint
∑n
i=1A
i
t ≥ 0 results in∑n
i=1 b
i ≤ ∑ni=1(B∗,iω + di). Otherwise, β∗(ω, b) should be the closest valid battery level
to B∗(ω). The structure of cost minimizing policy for 2 users when the total electricity
storage in the battery (4.8) is above the threshold follows immediately.
An equivalent problem for the discounted weighted cost minimization: Even
though we have shown that the optimal policy µC†ρ (ω, δ, b) is independent of b, the imme-
diate cost function (4.11) comprises ω, δ, b. Therefore the state space when minimizing
(4.12) can increase rapidly as n increases. Such a state space can be tremendous even when
more than a few users share the battery. We however present a linear integer programming
optimization problem that only requires states ω, δ which yields the same optimal policy
in order to simplify the problem. We use φ = (ω, δ) as a composite system state, where
Φ = Ω × Π∆i is the state space and PΦ is the resulting transition matrix. p is the price
column vector and [p]j is the price at state φj .
BC†ρ is the optimal policy matrix in which [B
C†
ρ ]i,j = B
C†,j
ρ (φi) is the weighted cost
minimizing decision on the electricity storage of user j with state φi.
Theorem 5. The solution of the weighted cost minimization (4.9) is equivalent to:
BC†ρ = arg min
BCρ
11×|Φ|[I − ρPΦ]−1
[
((I − ρPΦ)p) ◦ (BCρ λ)
]
(4.17)
where ◦ is the Hadamard product. 1m×n is m× n matrix with all elements 1. I is an
identity matrix. BCρ is a |Φ|×nmatrix with constraintCB
C
ρ = {BCρ ∈ B|Φ|×n|
∑n
j=1[B
C
ρ ]i,j ∈
B,∀i}. λ = [λ1, ..., λn]T is the assigned weight for each user. Proof: In order to
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prove Theorem 2, we need to first construct a MDP and then transform it into a linear
programming problem. First, we propose an infinite horizon discounted MDP with the
same definition of state ω = {d1, ..., dn, p} ∈ Ω, decision β ∈ {β ∈ Bn|∑ni=1 βi ∈ B}
as the original MDP and define the transition using PΩ(ω, ω
′) which is independent of
β. γ(ω) is used to denote a stationary policy mapping state space Ω to the action space
{β ∈ Bn|∑ni=1 βi ∈ B}. The immediate cost function is defined as
c′(ω,β) =
n∑
i=1
(p− ρp′ω)λiβi +
n∑
i=1
λidip (4.18)
where λ, ρ is also the same as in the original problem. p′ω =
∑
ω′∈Ω PΩ(ω, ω
′)p′, ω′ =
{d′1, ..., d′n, p′} is the expected price of next step given the current state ω.
Therefore, the expected total discounted cost for any stationary policy γ(ω) in this
process is
C′(ω,γ(ω)) = c′(ω,γ(ω)) + ρ
∑
ω′
PΩ(ω, ω
′)C′(ω′,γ(ω′)) (4.19)
There exists a linear integer programming optimization whose solution B∗(ω) can
minimize the discounted weighted cost (4.8) with constraint CA:
minimize 11×|Ω|[I − ρPΩ]−1 [((I − ρPΩ)p) ◦ (βλ)] (4.20)
subject to β ∈ B,β11×n ∈ B
Lemma 6. Minimization of (4.19) yields the same optimal policy B∗(ω) as in the original
discounted weighted cost minimization problem (4.8) with constraints CA.
To prove Lemma 6 we just need to compare C′(ω,γ(ω)) with C(ω, b = 0,β(ω, 0) =
γ(ω)) terms by terms.
Solving the equivalent stochastic control problem of (4.19) would result in a linear
integer programming optimization [46].
minimize 11×|Ω|[I − ρPΩ]−1 [((I − ρPΩ)p) ◦ (βλ)] (4.21)
subject to β ∈ B,β11×n ∈ B
The optimal centralized battery management in limiting average formula-
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tion: Since the immediate cost function (4.1) is always bounded, the average weighted cost
for any policy µC always exists. When ρ → 1, we derive the linear programming solution
of the optimal centralized battery management in limiting average formulation:
BC† = arg min
BC
11×|Φ|[I − PΦ]−1
[
((I − PΦ)p) ◦ (BCλ)
]
(4.22)
The performance of the optimal centralized battery management strategy provides a
lower bound on the weighted summation of electricity cost of users. We will show in Section
4.4 that this lower bound can be achieved at a non-stationary equilibrium which is ensured
by the proposed credit based battery management strategy.
4.3.2 Privacy as a Stepwise Additive Metric
In order to study the maximum privacy preserving strategy, we first analyze the privacy
metric described in (4.2). Using the fact that a user’s demand is completely determined by
the environment and the unforeseeable additives, Dit = γi(ωt)+ δ
i
t, and the privacy analysis
techniques provided in Chapter 3, we can represent the privacy rp(µ
i) as:
rp(µ
i) = lim
τ→∞
1
τ
H(δi1, ..., δ
i
τ |ω0,M i1, ..., ωτ ,M iτ ) (4.23)
=Hδi − E[Hpr(δit)−Hpo(δit)] (4.24)
where Hδi denotes the entropy rate of δ
i
t, Hpr(δ
i
t) = H(δ
i
t|M i1,M i2, ...,M it−1) is the entropy
of δit prior to the messaging M
i
t and Hpo(δ
i
t) = H(δ
i
t|M i1,M i2, ...,M it ) is the entropy of δit
post to the messaging M it .
Using (4.24), we can numerically compute the privacy preserving performance of a
messaging strategy by tracking the message receiver’s estimated probability of δit.
In addition, we can upper bound the privacy preserving using (4.23):
rp(µ
i) ≤ Hδi (4.25)
This is due to the properties of the conditional entropy, H(δi1, ..., δ
i
τ |ω0,M i1, ..., ωτ ,M iτ ) ≤
H(δi1, ..., δ
i
τ ). It is worth noting that upper bound Hδi of the privacy preserving is achievable
when M it is independent of delta
i
t. Such messaging strategy is studied in Section 4.3.3.
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4.3.3 A Completely Privacy Preserving Strategy: Message Blind Battery
Management
When privacy is the top priority of all users and therefore they want to hide as much
information about their actual energy consumption as possible from the message receiver,
rp(µ
i) = Hδi . In order to do so, they send messages M
i
t independent of their unforeseeable
demands δit – a completely privacy preserving scenario.
Since M it is independent δ
i
t, messages M
i
t reveal no information other then what the
controller already knows. Independent of battery’s management strategy and the initial
state of the whole system, the controller’s belief on δit is going to converge to the stationary
distribution Pr∆i(δ). Therefore, there exists a centralized message blind battery manage-
ment strategy µC
′
not relying on message M it can preform optimally. µ
C′ can be derived by
solving the resulting battery control optimization with similar process as in Section 4.3.1.
The details of the optimization are not presented due to limited space.
In µC
′
, the battery controller uses a stationary policy which does not rely on messages
M it :
B′∗ = arg min
B′∈CB′
11×|Φ′|[I − PΦ′ ]−1
[
((I − PΦ′)p) ◦ (B′λ)
]
(4.26)
where φ′ = (ω, δP ) is the composite system state, Φ′ = Ω×∆P is the state space and P ′Φ is
the resulting transition matrix. p is the price column vector and [p]j is the price at state
φ′j = (ωφ′j , δ
P
φ′j
). B′ is a |Φ′|×n matrix with constraint CB′ = {B′ ∈ B|Φ′|×n|∑nj=1[B′]φ′,j ∈
B,∀φ′} where [B′]φ′,j denotes the battery storage allocation for user j when the composite
system state is φ′.
Theorem 7. If all users are sending zero information to the battery controller – µi: M it
are independent of δit, then RµC′ (ω0, δ0,B0) = minµC RµC (ω0, δ0,B0) for ∀i
Proof: This is a direct result of the battery control optimization when the controller’s
belief on δit converges to Pr∆i(δ).
In addition, we generalize this completely private messaging setup to partially private
messaging where the message set Mi are restricted |Mi| < |∆i| in Section 4.5.
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4.4 A Non-Stationary Equilibrium Of The Stochastic Game
When Privacy Requirement Is Relaxed
When privacy is not a concern rip = 0, the privacy constraint in (4.5) is relaxed. As
all users aim to minimize their own cost individually and the battery controller aims to
minimize the weighted cost sum, the stochastic game formulated in Section 4.2 is a general
sum, multi-player limiting average signaling game. The equilibrium of this category of
stochastic games usually does not exist or is difficult to find even if it exists. However,
due to the relatively advantageous position of the battery controller, a simple equilibrium
exists in this game and it performs as well as the optimal demand aware centralized energy
management system.
As we presented in Section 4.3.1, The optimal centralized energy management policy
under the infinite horizon limiting average weighted cost formulation µC† is a stationary
mapping from current system state to the new battery state BC† as in (4.22). The perfor-
mance of this stationary centralized battery control policy BC† provides the benchmark for
the socially optimal solution – R†C(ω0, δ0,B0), which we call the “demand-aware optimal
cost”. As we will see in the following section, if the privacy constraint is relaxed rip = 0,
this performance is achievable in a competitive user driven model as well by choosing an
appropriate battery control policy.
4.4.1 A Credit Based Battery Management Strategy
To achieve the socially optimal cost savings we propose a credit based battery man-
agement strategy µC∗ for the battery controller and it achieves the equilibrium point in the
limiting average signaling game we formulated in the previous section. When the battery
controller is using the credit based battery management strategy µC∗, the users are coerced
to communicate honestly about their demand Dit or unforeseeable demand state δ
i
t. Since
the users are now honest, the battery management can perform ideally on social optimality.
While communicating Dit and δ
i
t is equivalent, let us assume the battery controller
expects the users to send their unforeseeable demand state δit honestly, for the sake of
simplicity. The battery controller is going to record each users’ messages and count each
message’s appearance frequency. Based on these statistical information, the battery con-
troller will give a label Lit to each user to tell if it is “H”, honest, or “L”, lying using the
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following “credit checking” mechanism:
Lit =

H if Nt(δ,ω)Nt(ω) − Pr∆i(δ) ≤
C∆i√
n
,∀δ ∈ ∆i, ω ∈ Ω
and Nt(δ)t − Pr∆i(δ) ≤
C∆i√
n
,∀δ ∈ ∆i
L o.w.
(4.27)
where δ is any unforeseeable demand state of user i. Nt(δ) denotes the number of occurrence
of messages from i, M it = δ until time t and Nt(ω) denotes the number of occurrence of
ωt = ω until time t. Pr∆i(δ) is the stationary probability of δ of user i. C∆i is a constant
value depending on the transition probability P∆i .
In the credit based battery management µC∗, if Lit = L, the user i is denied to access the
battery until Lit = H. When L
i
t = H, the electricity storage for user i is managed according
to the optimal demand aware centralized battery control policy (4.22). Therefore, the credit
based battery management µC∗ can be described as:
µC∗ : βit =
 [B
C†]φt,i if Lit = T
0 if Lit = L
(4.28)
where φt = (ωt, δt) as mentioned previously. In addition, we denote the honest messaging
strategy for user i as µi∗ in (4.7).
In order to show µC∗, µi∗, ∀i is an equilibrium point, we propose Lemma 8 to constrain
the users’ behaviors such that the statistical properties of M it matches the probability distri-
bution of δit, then we use Lemma 9 to show that any other policies µ
i within the constraints
performs no better than µi∗ while the battery controller is using µC∗. Meanwhile, Lemma
10 proves the optimality of µC∗. The proofs of the Lemmas are presented in Appendix.
Lemma 8. Assume that the battery controller and other users stick to the strategies:
µ−i∗ = {µC∗, µj∗, ∀j = i}. For ∀µi, if there exists a  > 0, such that limt→∞ Pr{Nt(δ,ω)Nt(ω) 6=
Pr∆i(δ)} >  or limt→∞ Pr{Nt(δ)t 6= Pr∆i(δ)} > , then U iµ(ω0, δ0,B0) = EPtDit.
Proof: If ∃ > 0, such that limt→∞ Pr{Nt(δ,ω)Nt(ω) 6= Pr∆i(δ)} >  or limt→∞ Pr{
Nt(δ)
t 6=
Pr∆i(δ)} > , we have limt→∞ Pr{Lit = L} = 1. Therefore, limt→∞ Pr{Bit+1 = 0} = 1
according to the credit based battery management strategy µC∗. U iµ(ω0, δ0,B0) = EPtDit
comes after applying the definition of the limiting average cost (4.1) and (4.3)
Lemma 8 demonstrates the effectiveness of the “credit checking” – if the messages’
statistical property do not match the stationary probability distribution of δit, user i will
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be denied to use battery when time t→∞. In other words, even if user i decides to lie, its
messaging strategy is constrained. It is also easy to see µi∗ satisfies this constraint using
the strong law of large numbers of Markov Process [47] and VonBahr-Essen bound [48].
Lemma 9. For ∀µi, such that µi s.t. limt→∞ Pr{Nt(δ,ω)Nt(ω) 6= Pr∆i(δ)} = 0 and limt→∞
Pr{Nt(δ)t 6= Pr∆i(δ)} = 0, the following inequality always holds.
U iµ−i∗,µi(ω0, δ0,B0) ≥ U iµ∗(ω0, δ0,B0) (4.29)
where µ∗ = {µC∗, µi∗, ∀i} and µ−i∗ = {µC∗, µj∗, ∀j 6= i}.
Proof: First, U i
µ−i∗,µi(ω0, δ0,B0) is lower bounded by the limiting average cost of user
i when battery controller trust it unconditionally U i
µ−iC∗,µi,µSC (ω0, δ0,B0). µ
SC stands for
the stationary centralized battery control policy Bit+1 = [B
∗]φt,i. Due to the assumption
that Nt(δ,ω)Nt(ω) → Pr∆i(δ) and
Nt(δ)
t → Pr∆i(δ) in probability, limT→∞
∑T
t=0 u(D
i
t,Pt,B
i
t,B
i
t+1)
T
exists.
As a result, U i
µ−iC∗,µi,µSC (ω0, δ0,B0) = E limT→∞
∑T
t=0 Pt(D
i
t+B
i
t+1−Bit)
T and it can be
further reformed to three parts:E limT→∞
∑T
t=0 Pt(D
i
t)
T − E limT→∞
∑T
t=0 PtB
i
t
T + E limT→∞∑T
t=0 PtB
i
t+1
T . While the first component is independent of strategy, the second and third
components are also invariant of µi as the distribution of the messaging mit = δ does not
change and mit is also uncorrelated with ωt and independent of δ
P
t .
Therefore, U i
µ−iC∗,µi,µSC (ω0, δ0,B0) is equal to U iµ∗(ω0, δ0,B0)
Lemma 9 shows the optimality of µi∗ within the constraints of the credit checking.
Combining Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, we can conclude that any unilateral deviation by user
i can not reduce its electricity cost when the users and the battery controller implement
strategies µC∗, µi∗, ∀i.
Lemma 10. ∀µC , µ1, ..., un, Rµ(ω0, δ0,B0) is lower bounded by the demand-aware optimal
cost, R∗C(ω0, δ0,B0) and it is achieved when the users and the battery controller implement
µC∗, µi∗, ∀i.
Proof: It is obvious that any messaging policy and battery control management strat-
egy in the proposed signaling game can be realized in the centralized battery management
as the users’ unforeseeable state is known by the controller and all behaviors of the users and
the controller in the game can be simulated. Therefore, Rµ(ω0, δ0,B0) is lower bounded
by the demand-aware optimal cost, R∗C(ω0, δ0,B0).
In the following section, when the users and the controller performs on µC∗, µi∗,∀i,
the users are honest to the controller and the controller has the same information as the
52
demand aware centralized battery management. Therefore, adopting the stationary battery
management strategy should yield the desired lower bound.
As a result of Lemma 10, the strategies µC∗, µi∗, ∀i respectively for the controller and
the users yields the lowest possible weighted cost. Any unilateral deviation by the battery
controller can not reduce the weighted electricity cost. In the following we show that the
weighted cost thus achieved at the equilibrium is indeed the social optimality as well; in
other words, the competitive equilibrium performs as well as the centralized scheme with
complete information at the battery controller.
Theorem 11. µC∗, µi∗, ∀i is the equilibrium point of proposed infinite horizon limiting
average signaling game. From the perspective of the battery, this equilibrium point yields
the optimal weighted cost.
Proof: Combining Lemma 8 - 10, Any unilateral deviation by the battery controller
will not reduce the weighted cost and any unilateral deviation by any user will not reduce
its own cost. Therefore, µC∗, µi∗, ∀i is the equilibrium point of proposed infinite horizon
limiting average signaling game. In addition, µC∗, µi∗,∀i achieves the lower bound of the
weighted cost according to Lemma 10.
In this section, we proved that with the proposed credit based battery management
strategy, the users gain no benefits from forging messages in long term operations. Since the
users are honest, the battery management performs ideally and achieves the lower bound
of the electricity cost. However, we notice that there are also drawbacks with this strategy:
• It might raise privacy concerns as users are forced to report their unforeseeable de-
mand components honestly and comprehensively.
• Even if a user is always honestly using µi∗, he can be denied to access the battery
storage for a certain period of time with non-zero probability. In other words, the
false alert happens and can influence the users experience badly.
• The convergence rate of the accurate “credit checking” (4.27) relies on the properties
of the Markov process δit and it is not fast in general as an order of O(n
−0.5).
Due to the mentioned concerns of the credit based battery management strategy, we con-
sider a class of privacy preserving battery management strategy where the message set
being restricted |Mi| < |∆it|.
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4.4.2 A Special Case: i.i.d. Unforeseeable Demand
When the unforeseeable demand states δit are i.i.d., the message blind battery man-
agement strategy in Section 4.3.3 performs equally as the optimal centralized battery man-
agement as proved in Theorem 12.
Theorem 12. If δit are i.i.d. for ∀i, then U iµC′ (ω0, δ0,B0) = U iµi∗,µC†(ω0, δ0,B0) for ∀i
Proof: This theorem can be proved by comparing the message blind battery man-
agement strategy µC
′
description (4.26) and the optimal centralized battery management
strategy (4.22), [PΦ]φj ,φk = PΩ(ωk, ωj)×
∏n
i=1 Pr∆i(δ
i
k), PΦ is a matrix consisting of block
with repeating elements. So there always ∃B′ s.t. 11×|Φ′|[I−PΦ′ ]−1 [((I − PΦ′)p) ◦ (B′λ)] =
11×|Φ|[I−PΦ]−1[((I−PΦ)p)◦ (Bλ)] for ∀B and vice versa: there always ∃B s.t. 11×|Φ|[I−
PΦ]
−1 [((I − PΦ)p) ◦ (Bλ)] = 11×|Φ′|[I − PΦ′ ]−1 [((I − PΦ′)p) ◦ (B′λ)] for ∀B′.
A direct inference from Theorem 12 is that the message blind battery management
strategy ensures the Nash equilibrium of the battery sharing game when the unforeseeable
demand states δit are i.i.d.. It is easy to see that the battery controller does not have
motivation to change strategy since the weighted sum (4.4) has already been optimized.
The users have no intention to change their strategy since it won’t influence cost savings.
Though it is not accurate to approximate the Markovian process δit using i.i.d. process,
it is reasonable to presume that the message blind battery management strategy yields a
close performance to optimum when δit is less correlated in time.
4.5 Privacy Preserving Battery Management Strategy
While the credit based battery management strategy optimizes the weighted sum of
cost savings and the message blind battery management strategy minimizes privacy con-
cerns of users on the battery controller, we also explore the ground lies in between, the
privacy aware battery management.
Privacy Preserving Messaging Behaviors: In order to partially preserve users’
privacy from the battery controller, we assume the battery controller and users have an
agreement on the message set 1 ≤ |Mi| ≤ |∆it| and users’ messaging behaviors:
µi : M it = f
i(δit), i = 1, ..., n (4.30)
where f i is a surjective function from ∆it to Mi and known to the user i and the battery
controller. Different level of privacy can be preserved by changing the size of Mi. When
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privacy is preserved completely, |Mi| == 0 or 1, it is equivalent to the message blind
battery management strategy. On the other hand, when there is no requirement on privacy,
|Mi| = |∆it|, it is equivalent to the centralized battery management.
Battery Management Strategy: To minimize the limiting average weighted cost
(4.4), the battery controller in the privacy aware battery management setup uses a policy
with similar structure of (4.13) in the centralized battery management. Since the messages
do not directly describe the unforeseeable part of demands δt, the battery controller is going
to keep track of the belief on δt, which is noted as pipo(δt):
pipo(δt) = Pr{δt|m0, ...,mt}
= Pr{δt|pipo(δt−1),mt} (4.31)
Lemma 13. There exists function µC(ωt, pipo(δt)) independent of b such that the optimal
policy that minimize the weighted cost of users in the privacy preserving battery management
setup:
µC(ω0,m0, b0, ..., ωt,mt, bt) = µ
C(ωt, pipo(δt)) (4.32)
Proof: The proof of the structure (4.32) is similar to the proof of Lemma 4 and is
omitted due to limited space.
Though the general privacy preserving battery management optimization can not be
reduced to a linear programming problem since the composite state space {ωt, pipo(δt)} can
be infinite because that the transition of belief pipo(δt) may not converge, it still can be
optimized numerically in simulations.
It is worth noting that it is difficult to claim a general privacy preserving battery
management strategy on a Nash equilibrium when |Mi| 6= |∆it| and |Mi| 6= 1. Since the
transition of the belief state may not have a stationary distribution in privacy preserving
battery management. Statistics of the belief state is generally not a reliable way to deter-
mine whether a user is honest or not which could be a drawback of the privacy preserving
battery management. However, as we are going to show in the simulations, even the com-
pletely private messaging case – message blind battery management, preforms close to the
optimal centralized battery management.
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4.6 Simulation Results
In this section, we use real data to train the system model and validate our work
using a numerical simulation. The core state is assumed to be the time of the day and
the average electricity consumption at the same time of the day is used as environment
dependent energy demand. The deviations between the demand and its same time average
are formulated as the unforeseeable demand component δit. This model is applied to the
electricity price as well. We use part of the electricity usage data of a home [43] to train the
Markovian model of users’ demands, and part of the time-of-use pricing data published by
NY ISO [44] to train the price model. The rest of the data is used to numerically validate
our theoretical results. The unforeseeable components are discretized into 10 levels and
they are assumed to follow an Markovian Process. Time is resampled to 0.5 hour interval
as the discreted price change is not very frequent. The shared battery is assumed to have
3 kWh capacity. As both users are relatively small electricity consumers with peak power
consumptions less than 1.5 kW, a battery with 3kWh is reasonable in this case.
In Fig.4.4, we compare the cost savings performance of different messaging and battery
management strategies. When the privacy is not the concern, the optimal two users cost
savings tradeoff is achieved by running on the equilibrium point µ∗ where the battery
controller uses the credit based battery management strategy. When the privacy is the
top priority, the message blind battery management strategy scarifies some cost savings in
exchange of privacy protection. To demonstrate the ground lies in between, we present the
privacy preserving battery management when |Mi| = |∆it|2 . In contrast, we compare our
results with a simple policy in which battery capacity is equally and statically allocated
when each user’s electricity storage is managed independently. The region of cost-savings
is acquired by sweeping across all possible weightings λ.
We can observe that the dynamic battery sharing is more efficient than static alloca-
tion, especially when users are equally weighted. Meanwhile, both the complete and partial
privacy preserving battery management performs close to the optimal credit based bat-
tery management. However, both the partial privacy preserving and message blind battery
managements are outperformed by the static battery allocation management at the end of
the curves. When the battery allocations are extremely biased, the cost saving performance
of static battery allocation strategy converges to the optimal credit based battery manage-
ment. However, the insufficient demand information for privacy protection still cause the
loss in cost savings, which demonstrate that the tradeoff between utility and privacy.
In order to demonstrate the tradeoff between cost savings and users’ privacy in Fig.4.5,
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Figure 4.4: Cost savings tradeoff between 2 users with a shared battery under the limiting
average signaling game formulation
we present the achievable privacy-cost savings pairs by using the privacy preserving battery
management strategies with different message setMi and messaging policy µi. We can ob-
serve that even a completely private messaging setup – message blind battery management
performs close to the optimum compared to the static battery allocation setup while the
unforeseeable part of demands δit has been perfectly hidden. This is because in real life, the
majority of demands are environment related and predictable if sufficient historical data of
a user can be collected.
We illustrate the performance convergence rates of different energy storage manage-
ment strategies in Fig.4.6 including a simple static capacity allocation strategy. In this
simulation, we assume users have the same priority to the battery λ = {0.5, 0.5}. As
demonstrated, the performance of the optimal credit based battery management takes
longer time to converge than the statistical battery allocation method. The performance
oscillation is due to the unavoidable possibility of false alert of credit checking. However, the
performance of the message blind, privacy preserving and the statistical allocation battery
management converges with the same speed since they are stationary in nature.
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Figure 4.6: Convergence rate of RT (µ) under the limiting average signaling game formula-
tion
4.7 Summary
In this work, we studied a privacy aware battery management problem assuming ra-
tional users and the battery controller relies on the communications with the users to make
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decisions. A game theoretical framework was built with an infinite horizon limiting average
signaling game formulation. The privacy requirement serves as a constraint on messaging
behaviors.
When the privacy requirement is relaxed, the competitive behaviors of users sending
messages to the battery controller is studied. The credit based battery management strategy
is designed for the battery controller to ensure an equilibrium of the game and achieves the
social optimality. In this credit based battery management strategy, one user’s access to
the battery is strictly denied whenever he is found giving “abnormal” messages.
When the privacy requirement is top priority, a message blind strategy is proposed to
optimally manage the battery. We also present a privacy preserving battery management
to achieve a tradeoff between cost savings and privacy protection.
Numerical example with real world data is provided to evaluate our proposed battery
management strategies, and demonstrate the cost effectiveness of battery sharing and the
tradeoff between the privacy and cost reduction.
Investigating the impact of battery value depreciation and optimization of privacy
preserving messaging given cost savings constraint are interesting topics for future research.
59
5. Quantitative Risk Assessment of Cyber Attack
on DSM
Cyber-enabled Demand Side Management (DSM) plays a crucial role in smart grid by
providing automated decision-making capabilities that selectively schedule loads on these
local grids to improve power balance and grid stability. Security and reliability of the cyber
infrastructure that enables DSM is therefore critical to ensuring reliability and safety in
energy delivery systems. The DSM communication are usually built on Advanced Meter-
ing Infrastructure (AMI). However, by virtue of topological weaknesses, it is vulnerable to
cyber attacks that are undetectable or stealthy. In this work, we investigate the topological
vulnerabilities of DSM networks that could result in potential theft of electricity through
hacked smart meters. In particular, a provably correct risk assessment protocol is proposed
to identify completely the individual nodes in mesh network based AMIs that are potential
targets of such economically motivated stealthy cyber attacks. The protocol proposed uti-
lizes knowledge of the network topology and data obtained from existing system monitoring
technologies. A case study is provided to demonstrate the protocol and its effectiveness.
Another major challenge in DSM security is that the feedback mechanism in the load man-
agement may aggravate the impact of cyber attack on the DSM system. We investigate
the behavior of such feedback loop under the intentional cyber attack and evaluate its po-
tential risk of overloading the power grid components. In particular, a tight upper bound
is provided to characterize the potential risk when a fixed portion of the controllable loads
are compromised.
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5.1 Preliminaries
5.1.1 DSM System Model
Consider a local electric power distribution network consisting by a set N of N cus-
tomers that are served by a single utility company. The utility company participates in
wholesale electricity markets to purchase electricity from generators and then sell it to cus-
tomers. Even though wholesale prices can fluctuate rapidly, traditional utility companies
hide this volatility from their customers and offer electricity at a flat rate. To encourage
the efficient use of electricity, an increasing number of utilities start to use dynamic pric-
ing in the retail market to coordinate the customers demand responses to the benefit of
individual customers and the overall system. We now present our model of such a DSM sys-
tem, describe how the utility set the electricity prices dynamically, how customers typically
respond and the distribution grid connects them.
We consider a discrete-time model with a infinite horizon. Time is divided into equal
duration, indexed by t ∈ T := {. . . ,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . . }.
Utility company: The utility company provides enough electricity to meet the de-
mands of the N customers. In general, there are different designs of end-user demand
response program including real-time pricing, direct load management and etc. For the
simplicity of presenting, we assume the real-time pricing scheme is in use. However, various
types of demand response policies should also fit into this model since their load manage-
ment actions are eventually equivalent to real time pricing if the consumers are modeled
appropriately. For example, load shedding scheme can be modeled as real time pricing
with minimum price variations but extremely sensitive users. In this example, load shed-
ding actions can be treated as slight variation of price. Though the majority of users are
insensitive with such price change, certain sensitive users shut down their controllable de-
vices when price increase slightly. On the other hand, the design of the real-time electricity
prices needs to reflect running costs of the utility company and the payments incurred in
the various wholesale markets. Such topic is beyond the scope of this paper. For simplicity,
we make the important assumption that this design can be summarized by a cost function
C(q) that specifies the cost for the utility company to provide q amount of power to the
N customers in a time interval. The modeling of the cost function is an active research
issue. Here we assume the cost function C(q) to be stationary over time t and quadratic
on q. As a result, the optimal pricing strategy for the utility company is to set the new
price p(t+ 1), t ∈ T according to the margins of the cost function C(q), which is a common
61
practice in industry:
p(t+ 1) =
dC(x)
dx
|x=q(t) = c1q(t) + c0 (5.1)
where c0, c1 are fixed constants derived from cost function of C(q) and q(t) is the total
power consumption of the N customers at time t.
Customers: For each customer i ∈ N , we denote by di(t) its power draw at time
t ∈ T . Now we can express the total electricity load as:
q(t) =
∑
i∈N
di(t) (5.2)
Each customer i is characterized by two parameters:
• a utility function Ui(di) that quantifies the utility user i obtains when he consumes
di power at a time interval; and
• a set of linear inequalities Di ≤ di(t) ≤ Di on power draw by each user.
The modeling of the utility function is very subjective and depends on the properties of the
customers’ loads. In this work, we assume that Ui(di) is quadratic since it reflects utility’s
marginal diminishing of energy consuming which is a common practice in various researches.
Therefore the net utility for costumer i to consume di power at time t is Ui(di) − p(t)di.
Maximizing the net utility would result in:
arg max
x
[Ui(x)− p(t)x] = u′p(t) + u′′ (5.3)
where u′, u′′ are fixed constants derived from utility function of Ui(di). However, the reac-
tion time of different appliances and the communication delay between the utility company
and the customers can vary, we assume that actual power consumption of costumer i is a
linear combination of prices with different delays:
di(t) =
∞∑
k=0
uki p(t− k) + ui (5.4)
where uki and ui are derived from Ui(di), depending on the properties of consumer i.
Power distribution grid: In this work, we consider the impact of cyber attacks
on the power distribution grid. Distribution network are usually divided into three types
– radial, ring or network. For the simplicity of presenting, we assume that the power
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Figure 5.1: A typical radial residential distribution network
distribution grid is a radial network since it is the most common type of structure in power
distribution system and the results can be easily extended to other power distribution grid
structures. The
A pictorial representation of the radial power distribution network consisting of mul-
tiple costumers is shown in Fig.5.1. While the costumers are labeled as 1, 2, 3, ..., N , power
lines are labeled as M = {l0, l1, l2, ..., lM}. In this work, we investigate the load qj(t) on
each power line lj at time t in existence of DSM cyber attack and determine the potential
overload on these power lines. The capacity of each line is denoted as γj , j ∈M . We denote
the described power grid as G = (N ,M).
5.1.2 Cyber Attack Model
In this work, we consider malicious attacker whose objective is to cause overloads on the
power distribution grid by tampering with the DSM system. The communication of DSM
system are usually built on AMI, which is suffering from the weak encryption and security
design [13]. Since the AMI is usually located distributively in residential area and is easily
accessible, it is easy for the attacker to find an access point though compromising the whole
system might be impractical. In addition, the mesh structure of the AMI communication
network enables the attacker to spread his impact even if only one access point in the
system is compromised. In this work, we assume the malicious attacker is aware of the
power distribution grid structure G and entire system states including pricing strategies
c0, c1 and the loads preferences ui, u
0
i , u
1
i , . . . |i ∈ N . Since the objective of this work is to
evaluate the vulnerabilities of the power distribution grid and the potential risks of DSM
cyber attack, it is reasonable to assume the attacker is both knowledgeable and rational.
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Actions and strategies of the attacker: In this work, we assume that a subset
of all the N customers are compromised by the attacker and we denote this subset as D.
These compromised customers need not to be along the same power line or under the same
substation since the mesh communication network may have very different structure than
the power grid. There are generally two types of cyber attacks the attacker may launch
on these customers: pricing data injection in which the compromised customers receive
manipulated pricing information, and direct load manipulation in which the appliances
of the compromised customers are under the control of the attacker. The pricing data
injection attack can happen when the communication encryption is broken and the direct
load manipulation can happen when the DSM load controllers have been hacked into.
• Pricing data injection AP : The attacker can manipulate prices p(t) received by
each compromised costumer i ∈ D, and the received price pi(t) can be different for
different costumers in order to achieve the attacker’s desired effect:
AP : pi(t) = aPi (t),∀i ∈ D (5.5)
• Direct load manipulation AL: The attacker can manipulate the load of each
compromised costumer di(t), i ∈ D directly:
AL : di(t) = aLi (t),∀i ∈ D (5.6)
where aPi (t) and a
L
i (t) for i ∈ D is the actions that the attacker can choose.
It is not difficult to see that these two types of attack are ultimately equivalent.
Theorem 14. Given a set of customers D compromised by the attcker, there always exists
a direct load manipulation AL such that all customers behave the same as any pricing data
injection attack AP is in effect. Vice verse, given a set of customers D compromised by
the attcker, there always exists a pricing data injection attack AP such that all customers
behave the same as any direct load manipulation AL is in effect.
Proof: When a group of costumers is under attack, to achieve the same effect of any
pricing data injection AP , aPi (t), the attacker can schedule the direct load manipulation
AL as aLi (t) = ui +
∑∞
j=0 u
j
ia
P
i (t − j). In this setup, the compromised costumers behave
the same way as receiving the injected prices aPi (t). On the other hand, the attacker can
forge a pricing series aPi (t) = [di(t)− ui −
∑∞
j=1 u
j
ia
P
i (t− j)]/u0i to make the compromised
costumers to behave as any direct load manipulation aLi (t).
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Since pricing data injection and direct load manipulation attacks are eventually equiv-
alent, we now constrain ourselves on the direct load manipulation AL. For the ease of
reading, A and ai(t) implies the direct load manipulation AL and aLi (t) from now on.
We let µ(G,D, c0, c1, ui, uki |i ∈ N , k ≥ 0) denote the attack strategy that maps all
known system properties G,D, c0, c1, ui, uki |i ∈ N , k ≥ 0 to the direct load manipulation
action series {ai(t)|i ∈ D, t = . . . ,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . . }.
Objective of attacker: There are different harms an attacker can do on the power
distribution grid. For example, an attacker can cause chaotic metering by messing the
metering data transmission, efficiency loss of the energy provision by causing greater load
volatility, or the energy system failure by overloading the power lines or devices. The focus
of this work is on the potential system failure because of its catastrophic results and the
potential influence on the critical infrastructures. Therefore, we want to determine if there
exists an attack strategy for the attacker who compromised a certain customer set D to
overload a power line lj . In other words, we want to determine maximum load q
∗
j on power
line lj given the compromised customer set D:
q∗j = max
µ(G,D,c0,c1,ui,uki |i∈N ,k≥0)
max
t
qj(t) (5.7)
and compare q∗j with the line capacity γj . If q
∗
j > γj , power line lj can be overloaded and
therefore vulnerable to the attacker in control of D. As defenders, we are not sure about
which power line the attacker is targeting on and our objective is to find out all vulnerable
power lines in the power distribution grid efficiently given that a compromised customer
set D.
5.2 A Discrete Time Linear System Formulation
In this section, we build a connection between the cyber attack A, ai(t) and the load
qj(t) on a power line lj which helps to derive the optimal attack strategy and the maximum
load q∗j . To do so, we first connect the attack ai(t) and the electricity price p(t). Thereafter,
we can determine the electricity load of all customers and the power line load qj(t).
65
5.2.1 Electricity Price Impacted By Attack
Consider the impact direct load manipulation (5.6) on customers in D and the load
properties (5.4) of uninfluenced customers N\D, we get the impacted total electricity load:
q′(t) =
∑
i∈N\D
di(t) +
∑
i∈D
ai(t)
=
∞∑
k=0
 ∑
i∈N\D
uki
 p(t− k) + ∑
i∈N\D
ui +
∑
i∈D
ai(t) (5.8)
Plug the impacted total electricity load q′(t) in the utility’s pricing strategy (5.1) and
shift one time interval backward:
p(t) =
∞∑
k=0
c1 ∑
i∈N\D
uki
 p(t− k − 1) + c0 + ∑
i∈N\D
ui
+
∑
i∈D
ai(t− 1)
=
∞∑
k=0
λk+1p(t− k − 1) + c0 +
∑
i∈N\D
ui +
∑
i∈D
ai(t− 1) (5.9)
where we define constants λ0 and λk+1, k ≥ 0 to replace the coefficient terms for the ease
of presentation:
λk+1 = c1
∑
i∈N\D
uki , k ≥ 0 (5.10)
The attack-price relation (5.9) can be viewed as a feedback system as shown in Fig.5.2,
where A(Z) is the system input and P (Z) = Z{p(t)} is the output. A(Z) = Z(α(t)) is the
Z-transform of the bias aggregated load manipulation:
α(t) =
∑
i∈D
ai(t) +
∑
i∈N\D
ui + c0 (5.11)
and P (Z) = Z{p(t)}.
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Figure 5.2: The attack-price feedback loop illustration
We can write down the system transfer equation in Z-domain:
P (Z) =
Z−1
1−∑∞k=1 λkZ−kA(Z) (5.12)
5.2.2 Power Line Load Impacted By Attack
Now we determine the relation between any power line load qj(t) and the cyber attack
A, ai(t). Assume the costumers drawing electricity from this power line li forms a set Sj ,
we can then represent the power line load qj(t) as:
qj(t) =
∑
i∈Sj\D
di(t) +
∑
i∈Sj∩D
ai(t)
=
∞∑
k=0
 ∑
i∈Sj\D
uki
 p(t− k) + ∑
i∈Sj\D
ui +
∑
i∈Sj∩D
ai(t)
=
∞∑
k=0
σkj p(t− k) +
∑
i∈Sj\D
ui +
∑
i∈Sj∩D
ai(t) (5.13)
where we define constants σ′j and σ
k
j , k ≥ 0 to replace the coefficient terms for the ease of
presentation:
σkj =
∑
i∈Sj\D
uki , k ≥ 0 (5.14)
If we do a Z-transform on the power line load equation (5.12), we get Qj(Z) =
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Z{qj(t)}:
Qj(Z) =
( ∞∑
k=0
σkjZ
−k
)
P (Z) +Aj(Z) (5.15)
=
∑∞
k=0 σ
k
jZ
−k−1
1−∑∞k=1 λkZ−kA(Z) +Aj(Z) (5.16)
where Aj(Z) = Z(αj(t)) is the Z-transform of the bias aggregated load manipulation among
the costumers drawing electricity from power line li, Sj :
αj(t) =
∑
i∈Sj∩D
ai(t) +
∑
i∈Sj\D
ui (5.17)
Plugging (5.12) in (5.15), we finally get the relationship between the power line load
qj(t) and the cyber attack A, ai(t) in condition of compromised customer group D, (5.16).
Since manipulated load ai(t) is bounded by the actual load bounds Di and Di in the
direct load manipulation attack, αj(t) is also bound as αj ≤ αj(t) ≤ αj .
αj =
∑
i∈Sj∩D
Di +
∑
i∈Sj\D
ui
αj =
∑
i∈Sj∩D
Di +
∑
i∈Sj\D
ui (5.18)
5.3 Optimal Direct Load Manipulation Strategy
The focus of this work is to determine all vulnerable power lines in M such that the
attacker can find a strategy to overload given that a group of customers D are compromised
by the attacker. In order to do so, we first derive the maximum load q∗j described in (5.14)
which can be achieved with the optimal direct load manipulation strategy µ∗. Afterwards,
we design an depth first search algorithm to find out all vulnerable power lines efficiently.
In order to optimize qj(t) on the cyber attack A, ai(t), we first separate the aggregated
load manipulation α(t) in (5.11) into two independent parts:
α(t) = αj(t) + α
′
j(t) (5.19)
where αj(t) is the bias aggregated load manipulation down the power line lj described in
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(5.17) and α′j(t) represents the remaining load manipulation:
α′j(t) =
∑
i∈D\Sj
ai(t) +
∑
i∈(N\Sj)\D
ui + c0 (5.20)
α′j(t) is bound as α
′
i ≤ α′j(t) ≤ α′i.
α′i =
∑
i∈Sj∩D
Di +
∑
i∈Sj\D
ui + c0
α′i =
∑
i∈Sj∩D
Di +
∑
i∈Sj\D
ui + c0 (5.21)
Then we are able to reorganize the terms in (5.16):
Qj(Z) = HjAj(Z) +H
′
jA
′
j(Z) (5.22)
where A′j(Z) is the Z-transform of α′j(t). Hj and H ′j are:
Hj =
∑∞
k=0 σ
k
jZ
−k−1
1−∑∞k=1 λkZ−k + 1
H ′j =
∑∞
k=0 σ
k
jZ
−k−1
1−∑∞k=1 λkZ−k (5.23)
respectively. As a result, Qj(Z) in (5.22) is separated into two independent terms which
can be optimized individually. The optimization of Z−1 {HjAj(Z)} and Z−1
{
H ′jA
′
j(Z)
}
leads us to Theorem 15.
Theorem 15. The maximum load q∗j on power line lj given the compromised customer set
D in a power distribution network G is:
q∗j =
∞∑
τ=−∞
[
αjh
+
j (τ) + αjh
−
j (τ) + α
′
jh
′+
j (τ) + α
′
jh
′−
j (τ)
]
(5.24)
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which can be achieved by qj(t0) at any time t0, if attack strategy µ
∗ is used:
µ∗ : ai(t0 − t) =

Di, if (i ∈ D ∩ Sj) ∧ (hj(t) > 0)
or (i ∈ D\Sj) ∧ (h′j(t) > 0)
Di, otherwise
(5.25)
where hj(t) = Z−1{Hj(Z)} and h′j(t) = Z−1{H ′j(Z)} as in (5.23).
Proof: It is not difficult to see that cyber attack A, ai(t) and its effect on power line lj
is indifferent when shifting along the time horizon since we assume time t is infinite on both
positive and negative direction. If q∗j can be achieved by an attack strategy µ
1 : a1i (t), ∀i ∈ N
at time t1, qj,µ1(t) = q
∗
j , the same load can be achieved at any other time t2 by shifting the
attack strategy µ2 : a2i (t) = a
1
i (t − t2 + t1),∀i ∈ N . Therefore, we can choose any time t0
to optimize the maximum load on lj :
q∗j = max
ai(t),∀i∈D
qj(t0)
The remaining part of Theorem 15 is a direct result of the optimization of qj(t) =
Z−1 {Qj(Z)} at time t0 using the Qj(Z) in (5.22). Since αj(t) and α′j(t) is independent of
each other, we can optimize terms Z−1 {HjAj(Z)} (t0) and Z−1
{
H ′jA
′
j(Z)
}
(t0) separately.
Without loss of generality, we can write down the inverse Z-transform of the first one:
Z−1 {HjAj(Z)} (t0) =
∞∑
τ=−∞
αj(t0 − τ)hj(τ)
Since αj(t) is independent along time t, the optimization of Z−1 {HjAj(Z)} (t0) is equiva-
lent to the optimization of αj(t0 − τ)hj(τ) independently. The optimal attack strategy µ∗
and the maximum load q∗j in Theorem 15 follows naturally.
There are several insights we can take away from Theorem 15:
• The optimal cyber attack strategy on DSM is binary.
• When targeting on different power lines, the attacker should tailor its attack strategy
accordingly.
• With a carefully planned attack strategy, the attacker can create fluctuation and even
overload a power line lj , even if it does not have any direct control on the customers
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drawing electricity from the power line Sj .
5.4 A Depth First Search Algorithm For Vulnerability Search
After deriving the close form expression of q∗j in any power distribution network G and
compromised customer set D as in (5.24), we can traverse q∗j ,∀j ∈M on all the power lines
lj and search all vulnerabilities in G.
To compute q∗j , we have to calculate σ
k
j which has a time complexity of luM , then
inverse Z-transform which has a time complexity of lH log(lH). lu is the number of nontrivial
terms of load properties uki in (5.4) and lH is the number of nontrivial terms of hj(t).
Therefore, the computation of one q∗j has a time complexity of max{luM, lH log(lH)}. A
naive traverse of q∗j ,∀j ∈M has a time complexity of max{luM2, lH log(lH)M}.
In this section, we present a DFS algorithm to traverse all the power lines for q∗j ,∀j ∈M
efficiently. Due to the space constraint, we only present the key component of this DFS
algorithm, the update of σkj , in Algorithm 2. The complexity of updating σ
k
j for all the
Algorithm 2 Depth First Search of σkj
1: procedure Update σkj
2: σkj ← 0
3: for All customer i directly connected to j do
4: if i 6∈ D then
5: σkj ← σkj + uki
6: for All power lines j′ connected to j do
7: Update σkj′
8: σkj ← σkj + σkj′
return σkj
power lines is reduced to luM . The resulting time complexity of the vulnerability search is
max{luM, lH log(lH)M}. Such improvement may be unnoticeable when lH log(lH)M is the
significant term, but it can have a big influence when the power distribution network G is
large. Other values including Dj , Dj and etc can be efficiently calculated using the same
idea though they are not bottlenecking the vulnerability search time complexity.
5.5 Summary
In this work, we built a theoretical framework to evaluate the potential risks of ma-
licious DSM cyber attacks with certain capabilities. A close form expression of maximum
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power line load is derived when the DSM is under attack. An efficient depth first search al-
gorithm is developed to search for all power grid vulnerabilities. A case study was provided
to demonstrate the protocol and its effectiveness.
To continue our research, we plan to utilize our proposed vulnerability detection
method to assist the design of DSM communication network planning and high value attack
target protection. One naive approach is to test the vulnerabilities of different communi-
cation network plans or protection plans and choose the one with minimum vulnerabilities.
However, this approach is neither performance effective nor time efficient. Our objective is
to develop an efficient communication network design tool to minimize the potential targets
which requires a deep understanding of the vulnerability detection and a carefully designed
optimization.
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6. Conclusion and Future Works
6.1 Privacy Protection in DSM
We studied the privacy protection in demand response using an in-home energy storage
system. A pair of close bounds to characterize the optimal tradeoff between privacy protec-
tion and cost savings were given. Although the policy that solves the optimal tradeoff be-
tween privacy and cost savings remains an open problem, we believe that our bounds using
the revealing state approach are quite close. Operating costs are an important consideration
for the mechanism proposed in this research. While the key mathematical contributions
in this work do not consider operating costs, the framework does not preclude such costs
per se. For instance, a marginal amount can be added to the purchase price when charging
the battery, and a marginal cost incurred every time the battery is discharged. The policy
simulated with these inclusions would provide a tradeoff that is closer to practice.
Another approach of privacy protection in DSM is to tackle this issue from the metering
mechanism design. When the smart metering network is under attack, the fine electricity
profile transmitted upon it becomes an even greater privacy concern. The major objective
of smart meter is to enable variable electricity pricing. Though reporting the electric usage
in every short period of time can help the reliable and effective operation of power grid, it
is not the only way. Instead of transmitting how much electricity a consumer uses every
certain time period, the meter can calculate the bills of the users locally and only transmit
how much money a consumer used for electricity once a week or even once a month. The
variable pricing can be achieved by having the pricing plan broadcast to every smart meter
and then billing on consumer’s end. Such broadcast is necessary in classical smart metering
method anyway.
Though this metering scheme has some disadvantage than transmitting electricity us-
age every 15 mins, it can be used as a backup plan when the communication link is exposed
to cyber attacks for two benefits:
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1. Longer transmission interval gives more time to eliminate the threats.
2. The aggregated electric bills are much less sensitive. The amount of money a consumer
use on electricity in one week or one month reveals much less information than a
detailed electricity profile.
6.2 Energy Storage Sharing in DSM
We studied a privacy aware battery management problem assuming rational users and
the battery controller relies on the communications with the users to make decisions. A
game theoretical framework was built with an infinite horizon limiting average signaling
game formulation. The privacy requirement serves as a constraint on messaging behaviors.
When the privacy requirement is relaxed, the competitive behaviors of users sending
messages to the battery controller is studied. The credit based battery management strategy
is designed for the battery controller to ensure an equilibrium of the game and achieves the
social optimality. In this credit based battery management strategy, one user’s access to
the battery is strictly denied whenever he is found giving “abnormal” messages.
When the privacy requirement is top priority, a message blind strategy is proposed to
optimally manage the battery. We also present a privacy preserving battery management
to achieve a tradeoff between cost savings and privacy protection.
Numerical example with real world data is provided to evaluate our proposed battery
management strategies, and demonstrate the cost effectiveness of battery sharing and the
tradeoff between the privacy and cost reduction.
Investigating the impact of battery value depreciation and optimization of privacy
preserving messaging given cost savings constraint are interesting topics for future research.
6.3 Risk Management and Prevention of DSM Cyber Attack
We have focused on developing tools and algorithms for risk assessment and vulnera-
bility detection in the DSM infrastructure and operation. The tools/technologies developed
include:
1. Risk assessment framework of data integrity attacks on DSM. We propose a control-
theoretic approach, which captures the closed-loop nature of the DSM, to derive
fundamental stability conditions under data integrity attacks. The impacts of cyber
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attacks on the energy delivery system that can be quantitatively evaluated in this
framework include system failure caused by overloading and system instability.
2. DSM network topological vulnerabilities detection tool for undetectable cyber attack.
The DSM communication networks are usually built on existing Advanced Metering
Infrastructure (AMI), which are designed as mesh networks. If one meter is hacked,
not only can its own communication be altered, but all other data transmitted through
it may also be exposed to manipulation. Hacking of one communication module of a
smart meter on the AMI network can not only impact a significant number of users but
can also be conducted without being detected. We combine the network topological
vulnerability analysis with fault detection techniques using grid sensor readings to
provide a more comprehensive potential risk assessment on the AMI communication
network.
To continue on this topic, there is a need to further improve and complete the function-
ality of the risk assessment and the vulnerability detection tools. By integrating accurate
physical models of the electricity delivery system into this framework, We expect to achieve
a more comprehensive risk assessment and a more accurate vulnerability detection in DSM.
Based on this risk assessment model, secure communication network-planning tools can be
developed for DSM system to minimize the potential targets utilizing our developed risk
assessment framework. Such tools should fit in current existing network planning tool as
an add-on function.
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